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Postdoc Payback:  
A Call for Reform 
Every postdoctoral fellow (“postdoc”) who receives a Ruth L. 
Kirschstein National Research Service Award (“NRSA”) from the Na-
tional Institutes of Health (“NIH”) is required to sign a payback agree-
ment. This requirement was created by Congress, and mandates that 
the postdoc perform an additional month of health-related research or 
teaching for each month (up to a year) that the postdoc receives NRSA 
funds. Otherwise, the postdoc must pay back the same amount of 
money that he or she received from the NRSA. This is a problem be-
cause postdocs may be pressured to accept NRSAs by the professors 
who employ them. A postdoc benefits very little by receiving an 
NRSA, and nearly all the benefit goes to the professor who employs 
the postdoc. The postdoc’s professor is benefitted by no longer having 
to pay the postdoc’s salary because the NRSA provides stipend money 
for the postdoc. However, this leaves the postdoc stuck with the bur-
den of having to continue performing scientific research for an extra 
year or else pay back an equal amount of NRSA funds. Overall, the 
payback agreement is administered as an adhesion contract that pro-
vides very little benefit to the postdoc. Additionally, monitoring and 
enforcing the payback requirement does not benefit the public, but ra-
ther imposes costs on the United States. Because of these problems, 
the payback requirement should be discarded. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
After most biomedical scientists finish their Ph.D.s, they continue 
to perform research under the direction of a professor (“principle in-
vestigator” or “PI”) at a university for a few years. This period in which 
one performs additional research after finishing his or her Ph.D. (or 
other doctoral degree such as an M.D.) is generally referred to as a 
postdoctoral fellowship or postdoc. The scientist is also referred to as 
a postdoc during this period. The postdoc’s PI typically pays the post-
doc’s salary with grant money that the PI receives from the National 
Institutes of Health (“NIH”). However, instead of being funded by a 
PI’s grant money, about one out of ten1 postdocs in the biomedical 
 
 1.  See Nat’l Insts. of Health, NIH Funding of Students and Postdocs, ACD 
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field receive their salaries, or stipends as they are called, from the NIH 
in the form of a Ruth L. Kirschstein National Research Service Award 
(“NRSA”). 
Postdocs who receive NRSA funds have a restriction imposed on 
them that is not imposed on other postdocs. Even though the source 
of two postdoc’s funding may come ultimately from the NIH, the post-
doc who receives it in the form of an NRSA must fulfill an obligation 
of continuing to perform health-related or research teaching for an 
additional year after receiving one year of NRSA funding. This obli-
gation is imposed upon the postdoc through a payback agreement that 
the postdoc must sign to receive the NRSA2 If the postdoc does not 
fulfill the one-year obligation of biomedical research or health-related 
teaching, he or she must pay back the stipend money that he or she 
received. 
In understanding how postdocs receive NRSAs, and the accompa-
nying problems, consider the following story based on my experience 
and the experiences of other postdocs. 
Mr. Wormtongue is a successful graduate student. With his grad-
uation near at hand, it is time to decide what to do with the time that 
is given to him. In seeking employment opportunities, he writes the 
following email: 
Dear Professor Saruman, my name is Grimy Wormtongue. I will re-
ceive my Ph.D. next spring from the Neuroscience Program at 
Mordor University. I have been working in Dr. Shagrat Gorbag’s la-
boratory and have been studying the role of mitogen-activated pro-
tein kinases in pain signaling. I have developed an expertise in mo-
lecular biology techniques, including polymerase chain reaction, 
protein purification, and polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis, as well 
as in various methods of torture. I am impressed by your research, 
and would like to work in your lab when I graduate. Do you have any 
postdoctoral positions available? Please find a copy of my CV at-
tached to this email.-Grimy 
Mr. Wormtongue is excited when Dr. Saruman writes back and 
 
BIOMEDICAL WORKFORCE WORKING GROUP DATA (June 14, 2012), https://report.nih.gov/in-
vestigators_and_trainees/ACD_BWF/Phd_Graduate_info.aspx (showing that 6821 postdocs re-
ceived NRSA funding in 2009); Nat’l Insts. of Health, Postdoctoral, ACD BIOMEDICAL 
WORKFORCE WORKING GROUP DATA (June 14, 2012), https://report.nih.gov/investiga-
tors_and_trainees/ACD_BWF/Phd_Postdoctoral.aspx (estimating that there were 37,000 to 
68,000 U.S. postdocs in 2009). 
 2.  42 U.S.C. § 288(c) (2012); Ruth L. Kirschstein National Research Service Award Pay-
back Agreement, Form PHS 6031, June 2015, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/fund-
ing/416/phs6031.pdf [hereinafter Payback Agreement]. 
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invites him to come visit for an interview, and even more excited when 
he receives the following signed offer letter: 
Dear Grimy, I am pleased to offer you a postdoctoral position in my 
laboratory at the University of Isengard. Your full-time appointment 
will begin on 11/4/3018 of the third age, and will continue through 
11/3/3019. During this appointment year, you will receive an annual 
salary of $42,840, funded by my NIH grant number DE17794. The 
University has discretion to modify or change funding sources as nec-
essary but will notify you of the change if it impacts your title or re-
search project. To accept this offer, please provide your signature be-
low and return the signed copy. 
Dr. Wormtongue signs the form and moves to Isengard. On the 
first day, he fills out paperwork and gets his name badge. He loves 
Professor Saruman’s lab and becomes so immersed in the research that 
he forgets to go outside and develops a pale, wise face with heavy-lid-
ded eyes. 
About four months into his research, Professor Saruman comes to 
him and says, “Grimy, a new spot has opened up on our department’s 
training grant. The training program director owes me a favor, and she 
has agreed to put you on it. It will cover your stipend and other train-
ing-related expenses.” Dr. Wormtongue doesn’t think about this much 
until he receives an email from the department secretary, asking him 
to sign and return some paperwork for the training grant. One of the 
documents is a payback agreement. It contains the following state-
ment: 
In accepting a Ruth L. Kirschstein National Research Service Award 
to support my postdoctoral research training, I understand that my 
first 12 months of Kirschstein-NRSA support for postdoctoral re-
search training carries with it a payback obligation. I hereby agree to 
engage in a month of health-related research, health-related research 
training, or health-related teaching for each month I receive Kirsch-
stein-NRSA support for postdoctoral research training up to and in-
cluding 12 months. . . . I understand that if I fail to undertake or per-
form such service . . . the United States will be entitled to recover 
from me [the amount of NRSA funds that I receive].3 
Dr. Wormtongue is somewhat troubled by this because he does 
not like to have his freedom restricted. However, he is also intimidated 
by Professor Saruman and knows that Professor Saruman will be upset 
 
 3.  This wording is from Payback Agreement, supra note 2. 
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if he refuses to sign the document. Although Dr. Wormtongue is aware 
that it would be hard for Professor Saruman to fire him before his one-
year anniversary of employment at the University of Isengard, he 
wants to remain in Professor Saruman’s good graces so that Professor 
Saruman will write a positive recommendation letter when he seeks 
future employment. Dr. Wormtongue signs the document because he 
doesn’t want to rock the boat.4 
What if Dr. Wormtongue does not fulfill the obligation required 
by the payback agreement? Should he be required to pay back the sti-
pend money that he receives during his training even though he would 
have been paid the same amount by Professor Saruman and would not 
have had to pay back this money if he had not accepted the NRSA? 
Although this story was told using fictional characters, it describes 
what happens to postdocs in real life. For example, John Cheng had to 
repay $12,840 because he decided to teach in an elementary school af-
ter ending his NRSA fellowship in 1981.5 Here, I argue that postdocs 
like John Cheng and Grimy Wormtongue should not have to repay 
the stipend money they receive for their training and that the payback 
requirement should be discontinued. 
Section II of this paper presents additional background infor-
mation about the payback agreement; Section III describes some prob-
lems with the payback agreement; Section IV discusses legal issues in-
cluding contractual validity and conflict with minimum wage laws; 
Section V argues that enforcing the payback agreement goes against 
sound public policy; and Section VI concludes this paper by making 
recommendations for change. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
This section introduces the reader to biomedical research funding 
for postdocs, details how the payback agreement is administered, why 
it is problematic, and further sets the stage for issues discussed in sub-
sequent sections. 
A. Who Pays for Biomedical Research 
Although most biomedical research in the United States is carried 
 
 4.  The original adventures of Wormtongue and Saruman can be found in THE LORD 
OF THE RINGS series by J.R.R. TOLKIEN (1954–55).  
 5.  United States v. Cheng, 840 F. Supp. 93, 94–95 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 
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out internally by pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, a great 
deal is performed at universities.6 For academic scientists, biomedical 
research is primarily funded by the NIH, an agency of the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services, which is comprised of 
twenty-seven institutes and centers.7 The NIH conducts its own intra-
mural research, and also funds outside projects. Scientists submit grant 
proposals to the NIH, which are peer-reviewed, and a subset of these 
are selected for funding. The NIH supports roughly twenty-six billion 
dollars of research per year in this way.8 In addition to the NIH, private 
funding sources such as the American Heart Association, American 
Cancer Society, the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, and biotech-
nology and pharmaceutical companies invest a substantial amount of 
money in academic research.9 
Although biomedical research costs billions of dollars, it promotes 
innovation and economic development.10 The NIH’s mission is “to 
seek fundamental knowledge about the nature and behavior of living 
systems and the application of that knowledge to enhance health, 
lengthen life, and reduce illness and disability.”11 These goals have cer-
tainly been furthered through the accomplishments of science. At the 
turn of the twentieth century, life expectancy for men and women was 
fifty and fifty-three years, respectively, whereas in the year 2000, it was 
 
 6.  Hamilton Moses et al., Financial Anatomy of Biomedical Research, 294 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 1333, 1333–42 (2005). 
 7.  Institutes, Centers, And Offices, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/in-
stitutes-nih (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). 
 8.  HHS FY2016 Budget in Brief: National Institutes of Health (NIH), U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/about/budget/budget-in-brief/nih/index.html 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (“In FY 2016, about 83 percent of the [$31.3 billion] funds appropriated 
to NIH will flow out to the extramural community, which supports work by more than 300,000 
research personnel at over 2,500 organizations, including universities, medical schools, hospitals, 
and other research facilities.”). 
 9.  See Apply for a Research Grant, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/re-
search/applyforaresearchgrant/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2015); Research Funding Opportunities, 
AM. HEART ASS’N, http://my.americanheart.org/professional/Research/FundingOpportuni-
ties/Funding-Opportunities_UCM_316909_SubHomePage.jsp (last visited Dec. 22, 2015); Bio-
medical Research Programs, HOWARD HUGHES MED. INST., http://www.hhmi.org/pro-
grams/biomedical-research (last visited Dec. 22, 2015). 
 10.  Sean Pool & Jennifer Erickson, The High Return on Investment for Publicly Funded 
Research, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, Dec. 10, 2012, https://www.americanprogress.org/is-
sues/economy/report/2012/12/10/47481/the-high-return-on-investment-for-publicly-funded-
research/. 
 11.  What We Do, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-
do/mission-goals (last visited Nov. 17, 2015). 
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seventy-four and eighty years.12 Numerous diseases have been eradi-
cated through the development of new vaccines, and disease treat-
ments make many other diseases manageable.13 
The NRSA program was created in 1974 by the National Research 
Act14 and has funded training for more than 160,000 postdocs and stu-
dents over forty years.15 Most postdoc NRSA-recipients have Ph.D.s, 
but some have M.D.s16 The NRSA program’s purpose in funding post-
docs is “to help ensure that a diverse and highly trained workforce is 
available to assume leadership roles related to the Nation’s biomedical, 
behavioral and clinical research agenda.”17 
The National Research Council is a group that was created with 
the NRSA program and is commissioned to evaluate the nation’s needs 
for research personnel.18 Regarding the benefits of biomedical re-
search, the National Research Council has stated that “[t]o continue 
to derive and extend these benefits, we require a highly trained work-
force.”19 In seeking to develop a highly trained workforce, the NIH 
has been providing funding to students and postdocs in the form of 
fellowships since 1930.20 
B. Enter the Postdoc 
As with law graduates,21 jobs for Ph.D. graduates are limited. 
Competition is fierce to find jobs as professors or industry scientists, 
and it is a practical necessity to complete a postdoc to advance in a 
research career.22 Completion of at least three years of postdoctoral 
 
 12.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ADVANCING THE NATION’S 
HEALTH NEEDS 5 (2005).  
 13.  See id. 
 14.  42 U.S.C. § 288 (2012); National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348 § 102 (1974).  
 15.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., RESEARCH TRAINING IN THE 
BIOMEDICAL, BEHAVIORAL, AND CLINICAL RESEARCH SCIENCES 12 (2011). 
 16.  Physician-Scientist Workforce (PSW) Report 2014, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, 
http://report.nih.gov/workforce/psw/early_career_programs.aspx (last visited Dec. 21, 2015). 
 17.  NIH Grants Policy Statement § 11.3.3.3, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Mar. 31, 2015), 
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps/nihgps.pdf [hereinafter NIH Policy Statement].  
 18.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 15, at 1. 
 19.  Id.  
 20.  Id. at 9–10.   
 21.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, Burdened with Debt, Law School Graduates Struggle in 
Job Market, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/27/busi-
ness/dealbook/burdened-with-debt-law-school-graduates-struggle-in-job-market.html?_r=0. 
 22.  See Bruce Alberts et al., Rescuing US Biomedical Research from Its Systemic Flaws, 
111 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 5773, 5773–74 (2014) (referring to the “hypercompetitive sys-
tem” of academic biomedical research); Alice G. Walton, To Postdoc or Not To Postdoc?: How 
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research is a typical prerequisite for a job as a professor in academia or 
as a scientist in industry.23 Although some are lucky enough to find 
jobs without completing a postdoc, the majority of Ph.D. graduates 
end up in postdoctoral positions.24 Even for postdocs, there are not 
enough jobs. The postdoc has thus become not only a training ground 
but a place to wait for career options to creep up.25 Some people do 
postdocs because it is their only option upon graduation,26 and it is not 
uncommon for a scientist who cannot find a job to work as a postdoc 
for several years.27 
The NIH has estimated that there are between 37,000 and 68,000 
postdocs in the United States, many of whom perform full-time bio-
medical research.28 They are generally highly-trained but are paid sub-
stantially less than those who move on to industry positions.29 As pre-
scribed by the NIH, starting postdocs are paid a minimum salary of 
$42,840 per year, and the salary increases by an average of 4.5% per 
year for seven years up to $56,376.30 Some universities set a slightly 
higher standard for their postdocs.31 Although postdocs can theoreti-
cally negotiate for higher salaries, their wages tend to fall at or near the 
 
to Weigh Whether Postdoctoral Training Will Boost Your Career Prospects, GRADPSYCH, 
April 2014, at 35, http://www.apa.org/gradpsych/2014/04/postdoc.aspx (“In academia, postdocs 
aren’t required, but it’s almost become an unspoken rule to do one.”). 
 23.  See, e.g., Jennifer Rohn, In Which My Heart Goes Out to Postdoc B, MIND THE 
GAP (Aug. 2, 2011), http://occamstypewriter.org/mindthegap/2011/08/02/in-which-my-heart-
goes-out-to-postdoc-b/. 
 24.  Kendall Powell, The Future of the Postdoc, 520 NATURE 144, 146 (2015) (referring 
to the bottleneck that trainees face, and stating that 65% of people with Ph.D.s do postdocs).  
 25.  See Carolyn Y. Johnson, Glut of Postdoc Researchers Stirs Quiet Crisis in Science, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 5, 2014, https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/10/04/glut-postdoc-
researchers-stirs-quiet-crisis-science/HWxyErx9RNIW17khv0MWTN/story.html (“[I]n re-
cent years, the postdoc position has become less a stepping stone and more of a holding tank.”). 
 26.  See, e.g., Beryl Lieff Benderly, When Funding is a Costly Booby Trap, SCIENCE 
(Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.sciencemag.org/careers/2015/09/when-funding-costly-booby-trap 
(“Nothing concrete [in terms of job prospects] had developed by the time the professor offered 
him the postdoc, so Owen accepted the position, assuming he could leave when something better 
came along. Though meager, the salary was steady and the work would keep him professionally 
active while he searched for his new career path.”). 
 27.  Johnson, supra note 25. 
 28.  Nat’l Insts. of Health, supra note 1. 
 29.  See Thomas B. Hoffer & Vincent Welch, Jr., Time to Degree of U.S. Research Doc-
torate Recipients, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., Mar. 2006, http://www.nsf.gov/statis-
tics/infbrief/nsf06312/; Paula Stephan, How to Exploit Postdocs, 63 BIOSCIENCE 245 (2013). 
 30.  FY 2015 Funding and Operating Guidelines National Research Service and Career 
Development Awards, NAT’L HEART, LUNG, & BLOOD INST. (Feb. 2015), 
https://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/research/funding/general/nrsa-fund-guide.  
 31.  For example, Stanford currently sets the minimum for its postdocs at $50,000 per year 
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minimum set by the NIH or universities at which they work.32 
Universities generally have two schemes for paying postdocs. The 
first is to classify them as employees, and the second is through fellow-
ships such as NRSAs.33 Most postdocs initially come in under the em-
ployee scheme. They receive some form of full-time benefits, fill out 
W-2s, and have taxes withdrawn from their paychecks like regular em-
ployees. Typically, each postdoc works for a single professor and is 
paid by that professor’s grant funding. In the introductory hypothet-
ical, this is how Dr. Wormtongue was initially brought on by Professor 
Saruman, as outlined in his employment offer letter.34 His job title 
would then change from employee to fellow when he began receiving 
NRSA funds.35 
The effect on Dr. Wormtongue of becoming an NRSA-supported 
fellow would be that instead of being paid by Professor Saruman’s 
grant funds, he would be paid by NRSA funds. Additionally, he would 
need to file his own taxes using Form 1040-ES instead of having the 
university withhold taxes for him, and his wages would technically be 
considered a stipend instead of a salary.36 However, these changes 
would have few practical effects on him other than perhaps necessitat-
ing him to pay more to cover his own health insurance.37 In addition 
to providing funds for Dr. Wormtongue’s stipend, the training grant 
would also provide a small budget for training expenses such as travel-
ing to attend a meeting.38 However, because postdocs who are not on 
training grants typically have these expenses paid for by their PIs, the 
 
for the first three years. Funding Guidelines, STANFORD UNIV. (June 4, 2015), http://post-
docs.stanford.edu/handbook/salary.html. This minimum is increased by 4.0% for the next three 
years. Id.  
 32.  I say theoretically, because it is unlikely for most postdocs to negotiate for a substan-
tial increase in pay. Their bargaining powers are low, especially where there are plenty of other 
potential postdocs willing to take their places, and where higher-paying jobs are scarce. See Jor-
dan Weissmann, The Ph.D Bust: America’s Awful Market for Young Scientists—in 7 Charts, 
THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 20, 2013), www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/02/the-phd-bust-
americas-awful-market-for-young-scientists-in-7-charts/273339/.  
 33.  See, e.g., Compensation, UCSF OFFICE FOR POSTDOCTORAL SCHOLARS, 
http://postdocs.ucsf.edu/compensation (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (describing a postdoc employee 
as one who receives a salary, and postdoc fellow as one who receives extramural funding). 
 34.  See supra Introduction.  
 35.  See, e.g., Compensation, supra note 33. 
 36.  NIH Policy Statement, supra note 17, § 11.3.8.2. 
 37.  Id. § 11.3.8.7 (“[I]t is inappropriate and unallowable for organizations to seek funds, 
or to charge Kirschstein-NRSA institutional research training grants, for costs that normally 
would be associated with employee benefits (for example, FICA, workers compensation, life in-
surance, union dues, and unemployment insurance).”). 
 38.  Id. § 11.3.8.4. 
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budget for training expenses would also have little practical impact on 
Dr. Wormtongue. 
When postdocs receive fellowships, their universities and PIs are 
benefited because the PI’s grant money that was being used to pay their 
salaries can now be used for other purposes. University departments 
commonly write grant proposals to the NIH to obtain training funds 
from the NRSA program.39 Funds received in this way are referred to 
as T32 institutional research training grants;40 the majority of NRSA 
participants receive funding through these training grants.41 A typical 
training grant will provide funds for several predoctoral students and 
postdocs. The department that receives the training grant has discre-
tion about which students and postdocs to fund. Each training grant is 
supervised at the university by a training program director who is typ-
ically a professor.42 The training program director of each training 
grant is responsible “for the overall direction, management, and ad-
ministration of the training program,” and “for the selection and ap-
pointment of trainees to the Kirschstein-NRSA research training 
grant.”43 
Sometimes a university department will have students or profes-
sors compete for training grant funds, while other departments will 
arbitrarily assign the funds. For example, while I was a postdoc at 
Washington University in St. Louis, my PI applied to place me on a 
departmental training grant. As part of the application, he obtained 
letters of recommendation from people who had worked with me and 
submitted them to the department’s training program director. In an-
other instance, while I was a graduate student at the University of Mar-
yland, Baltimore, my PI was a training program director, and he made 
the decision to put me on the department’s training grant. He re-
marked that if he had to do the work of overseeing the training grant, 
he might as well get something for it by having it fund me. 
In addition to institutional training grants, postdocs and students 
can apply for individual fellowships (categorized as F32 fellowships) 
 
 39.  See Institutional Training Grants, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, https://researchtrain-
ing.nih.gov/programs/training-grants/T32 (last visited Jan. 9, 2016). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 15, at 12. On the 
other hand, thirty-five percent of postdoctoral NRSA-recipients receive their NRSAs through 
individual fellowships. Id. 
 42.  NIH Policy Statement, supra note 17, § 11.3.2.3; Institutional Training Grants, supra 
note 39. 
 43.  NIH Policy Statement, supra note 17, § 11.3.2.3. 
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directly from the NIH.44 Receiving one of these fellowships may carry 
some prestige due to the selective nature of the application process, 
but other than that, the practical consequences are the same as for 
those on training grants. Although at some universities receiving a fel-
lowship relieves a postdoc of having to teach classes or be a teaching 
assistant, employee-postdocs at many universities are not required to 
teach classes in return for their salaries because they are paid by their 
PI’s grant or startup funds. Thus, NRSAs are administered in the form 
of training grants and direct fellowships that carry very little benefit 
for most postdocs, while providing a boon to the postdocs’ PIs. 
C. Instigating Legislation – 42 U.S.C. § 288 
The Ruth L. Kirschstein NRSA program has funded over 160,000 
students and postdocs since its inception in 1974 and is currently cod-
ified under Section 288 of 42 U.S.C.45 The Act initially included a ser-
vice obligation for both postdocs and students who received NRSA 
support, but now requires it only of postdocs.46 In mandating the ser-
vice obligation, the statute states that “[e]ach individual who is awarded 
a Ruth L. Kirschstein National Research Service Award for postdoc-
toral research training shall . . . engage in research training, research, 
or teaching that is health-related (or any combination thereof) for the 
period specified in paragraph (2).”47 Paragraph (2) then goes on to de-
fine the period of the service obligation as “12 months, or one month 
for each month for which the individual involved receives a Ruth L. 
Kirschstein National Research Service Award for postdoctoral re-
search training, whichever is less.”48 Therefore, for each month up to 
a year of support, any postdoc who receives NRSA funds must engage 
in an equal period of health-related research or teaching. 
The statute delegates to “the Secretary [of Health and Human Ser-
vices]” to “by regulation prescribe the type of research and teaching in 
 
 44.  Id. § 11.2. 
 45.  42 U.S.C. § 288 (2012); National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348 § 102 (1974); 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 15, at 1.  
 46.  Historical Payback Reporting Requirements (Prior to June 10, 1993), 
https://grants.nih.gov/training/payback_historical_reporting_requirements.doc (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2015). 
 47.  § 288(c)(1). 
 48.  § 288(c)(2)(A). 
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which an individual may engage to comply with such require-
ment[s].”49 If the postdoc does not fulfill his or her service obligation, 
the statute authorizes the United States to recover the NRSA money 
that the postdoc received plus interest.50 The amount to be paid back 
may be reduced if the service obligation is partially completed.51 The 
statute also delegates to the Secretary to “provide for the waiver or 
suspension of any such obligation applicable to any individual when-
ever compliance by such individual is impossible or would involve sub-
stantial hardship to such individual or would be against equity and 
good conscience.”52 
D. Implementing 42 U.S.C. § 288 – The Payback Agreement 
As an agency of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, the NIH has implemented section 288 of 42 U.S.C. by creating 
regulations codified in part 66 of 42 C.F.R.53 Additionally, the NIH 
has implemented section 288(c) of 42 U.S.C. by creating a payback 
agreement that all postdocs must sign to receive NRSA support. The 
payback agreement (PHS 6031) outlines the required conditions.54 It 
states that the health-related research or teaching must be initiated 
within two years after terminating NRSA support, and the teaching or 
research must average at least twenty hours per week.55 It also men-
tions the possibility of the payback obligation being waived, or of the 
time for fulfilling the obligation being extended.56 These may occur in 
the case of impossibility due to disablement, or where “fulfillment 
would involve a substantial hardship and the enforcement of such ob-
ligation would be against equity and good conscience.”57 However, 
such waivers are rare.58 
The NIH has also created a policy statement that further defines 
 
 49.  § 288(c)(3). 
 50.  § 288(c)(4). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  § 288(c)(5)(B). 
 53.  42 C.F.R. § 66 (2014). 
 54.  Payback Agreement, supra note 2. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  NIH Policy Statement, supra note 17, § 11.4.3. 
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the terms of the payback requirement.59 For example, the policy state-
ment contains definitions of health-related, teaching, and research, 
and also outlines other details of how to fulfill the requirement.60 
The payback requirement is administered by the NRSA Payback 
Service Center (“Service Center”).61 After completing NRSA training, 
postdocs report their payback activities to the Service Center by sub-
mitting Annual Payback Activities Certification forms.62 This require-
ment is outlined in the payback agreement, which states, “on an annual 
basis I agree to complete and submit Annual Payback Activities Certi-
fication forms sent to me by the awarding Federal Agency concerning 
post-award activities.”63 
III.  THE PROBLEM OF THE PAYBACK AGREEMENT 
As I argue in Section II(B), instead of benefiting postdocs, NRSAs 
are a boon particularly to their PIs who do not bear the risk of non-
compliance with the payback requirement. Additionally, the payback 
agreement imposes difficulties on postdocs because it is not uncom-
mon for a postdoc to be unaware of the payback requirement until after 
the postdoc agrees with his or her PI to be on a training grant. Further, 
the payback requirements are vague and uncertain, and there is no 
guarantee that the NRSA Payback Service Center will administer the 
requirements predictably or consistently. Nothing is being done to re-
move the payback requirement from the NRSA program for postdocs, 








 59.  Id. § 11.4. 
 60.  Id. § 11.4.3.1. 
 61.  Ruth L. Kirschstein National Research Service Awards (NRSA) Payback Service Cen-
ter Home Page, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, https://researchtraining.nih.gov/training/payback (July 
31, 2015) [hereinafter Service Center Home Page]. 
 62.  Ruth L. Kirschstein National Research Service Award Annual Payback Activities Cer-
tification (APAC), Form PHS 6031-1 (June 2015), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/fund-
ing/416/phs6031-1.pdf [hereinafter APAC]. 
 63.  Payback Agreement, supra note 2. 
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A. Many Postdocs Do Not Know About the Payback Agreement 
When They Agree to Be on Training Grants 
The university that obtains a training grant is responsible for hav-
ing its postdocs sign the payback agreement.64 This is often done hap-
hazardly, as in Dr. Wormtongue’s case,65 so that the postdoc does not 
find out about the payback agreement until a secretary informs the 
postdoc that he or she must sign it as part of the training grant paper-
work. It is not generally brought up in the interview process for ob-
taining a postdoc position or even when the professor asks the postdoc 
to be on a training grant. In other words, the postdoc does not find out 
about the payback agreement until it is thrust upon him or her after 
having already agreed with his or her PI to be on a training grant. It is 
unfair to require postdocs to face this dilemma because of the disparity 
of power between postdocs and their PIs.66 PIs have enough power to 
affect the career progression of their postdocs that their postdocs 
would be disadvantaged in the job market without their help and 
should not be expected to disregard their wishes. 
In other cases, the postdoc does not start his or her postdoc until 
after applying to receive an NRSA. Although some university depart-
ments have set programs where potential postdocs apply to their train-
ing grants before the universities extend offers for those postdoctoral 
positions, such exceptions are rare, and they do not necessarily inform 
the postdoc about the payback agreement early in the application pro-
cess.67 In one instance, a medical practitioner moved to Boston to start 
an NRSA fellowship.68 It was not until after he arrived that he was in-
formed about the payback agreement.69 
 
 64.  NIH Policy Statement, supra note 17, § 11.3.7. 
 65.  See supra Introduction (stating that Dr. Wormtongue was placed on a training grant 
because the training program director owed his PI a favor). 
 66.  See infra Section IV(A)(3). 
 67.  One example of such an exception is the Research Training in Myocardial Biology at 
Stanford. See Application Procedure, STANFORD SCH. OF MED., http://med.stan-
ford.edu/cvmedicine/education/timbs/application-procedure.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2016). 
However, even this program does not mention the payback requirement in its informational ma-
terials. See Program Outline, STANFORD SCH. OF MED., http://med.stanford.edu/cvmedi-
cine/education/cv-imaging/program-outline.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2016).  
 68.  Thomas R. Klumpp, Effect on Physician-Scientists of the Low Funding Rate of NIH 
Grant Applications, 323 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1283, 1283–84 (1990) (letter to the editor). 
 69.  Id. This situation is not isolated to one individual. Another person, called “Owen A. 
Bundle” (name changed to prevent embarrassment) had a similar experience. See Benderly, supra 
note 26 (“Upon arriving at his new institution, however, Owen had a very unpleasant shock. Until 
then, he had only dealt with the professor. Now, the human resources department presented him 
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B. The Requirements for What is Considered Acceptable 
Payback Service Are Vague and Uncertain 
Even for postdocs who know in advance that they will be required 
to fulfill a payback obligation, the exact parameters of what is consid-
ered health-related teaching and research are unclear. Although con-
tinuing on as a postdoc under a NRSA fellowship is certainly consid-
ered health-related research,70 and clinical medical practice does not 
qualify as research or teaching,71 neither the statute nor the NIH has 
given specific examples of what else does or does not qualify. A policy 
statement by the NIH defines research, teaching, and health-related 
activities for the payback requirement,72 but the definitions leave many 
open-ended questions. For example, according to the statement, 
Research is defined as an activity that involves designing experiments, 
developing protocols, and collecting and interpreting data. In addi-
tion, review of original research or administration of original re-
search that includes providing scientific direction and guidance to re-
search may be acceptable if a doctoral degree and relevant research 
experience is required.73 
However, what about positions where having a Ph.D. and research 
experience are beneficial but not required? For example, what about 
postdocs who obtain employment in biotechnology business manage-
ment, consulting, legal work, technical writing, or journalism? The 
 
with a sheaf of papers to sign [including a previously unmentioned NRSA payback agreement].”). 
Yet another person reported having a similar experience in an online discussion forum. MLC, 
This is Insane!! Indentured Servitude is Back, SCIENCE CAREERS (Oct. 22, 2015, 7:18 PM), 
http://scforum.sciencecareers.org/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=10775&p=83024&hilit=train-
ing+grant+payback#p83024 (“I thought this article was exactly on-point, and reflects my own 
experience. I was not informed about the payback agreement until I was asked to sign it during 
my first week of work. It wasn’t a big deal to me at the time because . . . I *did* plan to stay in 
research. But, even then, I thought the way it was presented was very underhanded. . . . And the 
payback agreement BECAME a big deal for me. You never know what can and will change over 
2 years of your life, or what will change in the lab you’ve signed on to. My family has suddenly 
and unexpectedly been faced with significant hardship. At the same time, the once well-funded 
lab I’m in has been hemorrhaging funding and failed to renew service contracts on critical equip-
ment. So I have no equipment, no reagents, no real opportunity to progress professionally here— 
and at the same time, I need to earn more to support my family. But, because of the payback 
agreement terms, I’m rotting here, unable to take a more lucrative position, unable to even do 
the science I came here to do.”) (commenting on Benderly, supra note 26). 
 70.  NIH Policy Statement, supra note 17, § 11.4.2. 
 71.  “Payback” Under the National Research Service Award (NRSA), NAT’L HEART, 
LUNG, & BLOOD INST. (April 2015), http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/research/funding/research-sup-
port/t32/faqs/payback.  
 72.  NIH Policy Statement, supra note 17, § 11.4.3.1.1.  
 73.  Id.  
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definition seems to suggest that these positions may be acceptable, but 
is unclear. 
Similarly, the definition for health-related is vague. The term, 
health-related activities is defined as 
incorporat[ing] a broad range of activities related to the description, 
diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of disease from the most basic 
biomedical or behavioral research to the most applied or clinical re-
search. Activities in fields other than those usually considered to be 
directly related to human disease, such as agriculture, environmental 
sciences, biotechnology, and bioengineering, also will be considered 
health-related.74 
This definition includes a few clear examples of what is indirectly 
health-related. However, it is far from comprehensive and does not say 
where to draw the line by suggesting what is not health-related. The 
few examples of activities that are indirectly health-related do not pro-
vide a definition of what is indirectly health-related. For fields that 
seem indirectly health-related, but are not listed, these examples pro-
vide little guidance. For instance, what about legal work in patent law 
or science journalism? Is a postdoc going to have to risk being sued by 
the U.S. government to go into one of these fields? 
These vague definitions lead to wasted U.S. resources. Lawsuits 
could be avoided by clearer definitions that point out with particularity 
what activities constitute and do not constitute acceptable payback ser-
vice. For example, in United States v. Cheng, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California held that elemen-
tary school teaching was not health-related.75 The teacher, John 
Cheng, ended his NRSA fellowship in 1981.76 In 1988, Mr. Cheng re-
ceived a letter informing him that his debt had been referred to the 
IRS for collection by offsetting his taxes.77 He then submitted Annual 
Payback Activities Certification forms78 alleging that he had completed 
his payback service by being an elementary school teacher from 1981–
88.79 However, he was told by an attorney that the Department had 
determined that his teaching did not fulfill the payback requirements.80 
 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  United States v. Cheng, 840 F. Supp. 93, 95 (N.D. Cal. 1993).  
 76.  Id. at 94. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  APAC, supra note 62. 
 79.  Cheng, 840 F. Supp. at 95. 
 80.  Id.  
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The IRS then began withholding his tax refunds, and in 1992 the 
United States sued him for the remainder of what was due.81 This law-
suit likely would have been avoided if the NIH had written more spe-
cific definitions making it clear that elementary school teaching would 
not qualify as acceptable payback service. 
C. There Is No Guarantee that the NRSA Payback Service 
Center Will Administer the Payback Agreement Predictably 
or Consistently 
The NRSA Payback Service Center is staffed by three payback 
specialists.82 These specialists are considered the NIH’s experts on 
NRSA payback requirements,83 and may informally advise postdocs 
who have questions about whether positions the postdocs are consid-
ering are acceptable service. However, what the payback specialists 
consider to be health-related research and teaching may be purely dis-
cretionary, and there is no guarantee of consistency between what each 
of the three specialists considers acceptable.84 Further, there is no 
guarantee that a payback specialist will not change her mind after tell-
ing a postdoc that a certain activity may fulfill the payback require-
ments. Because a court may give great deference to the NIH in deter-
mining what activities constitute acceptable payback service,85 these 
three individuals hold a lot of power over postdoc NRSA-recipients. 
Problems of consistency could be avoided if a formal procedure 
was created for postdocs to submit queries about their future plans to 
the Service Center. For example, when a postdoc has a question about 
whether a specific job title qualifies as health-related research, the 
postdoc could submit a query that payback specialists would respond 
 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Service Center Home Page, supra note 61. 
 83.  NIH Policy Statement, supra note 17, § 11.4.3.  
 84.  I sought to find out details about how the NRSA Payback Service Center works by 
interviewing a payback specialist on Sep. 28, 2015. In declining to answer my questions, the pay-
back specialist referred me to the Service Center Home Page, supra note 61. Because nothing on 
the website says anything about how their decisions are controlled for consistency, I assume they 
are unchecked.  
 85.  Cheng, 840 F. Supp. at 94–95 (“The discretion to determine what constitutes appro-
priate service for the purposes of the NRSA service obligation resides in the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services . . . . The Secretary’s determination must be upheld 
unless it is arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.”) (citations omitted); see infra Sec-
tion IV(A). 
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to on the Service Center’s website.86 The website could post these que-
ries so other postdocs could view them. The public nature of formally 
posting the queries and responses would help ensure consistency 
among payback specialists. It would also allow postdocs to move into 
their new careers with confidence when their ideas are officially ap-
proved. 
A formal query procedure might have helped to avoid John 
Cheng’s troubles.87 For example, it would have enabled him to deter-
mine in advance whether elementary school teaching qualifies as 
health-related. Maybe when Mr. Cheng signed the payback agree-
ment, he thought elementary school teaching would count as accepta-
ble payback service.88 If he had been more aware, it seems likely that 
he would have decided against elementary school teaching after ending 
his NRSA fellowship. 
John Cheng’s case also highlights another problem of incon-
sistency in the NRSA Payback Service Center’s administration of the 
payback requirement. It does not appear that the Service Center has 
been consistent in notifying NRSA-recipients when they are delin-
quent on their payback activities. Better communication from the Ser-
vice Center could have alerted Mr. Cheng to the fact that his activities 
did not qualify as acceptable service before it was too late to pursue 
other activities that would qualify. For example, if the Service Center 
would have told Mr. Cheng in 1982 that he hadn’t submitted his An-
nual Payback Activities Certifications form, he might have submitted 
that form sooner, and the Service Center could have informed him, 
before it was too late, that elementary school teaching did not consti-
tute acceptable service. Instead, as is apparent from the court opinion 
on his case, nobody contacted him about his payback requirement until 
seven years after he completed his NRSA fellowship.89 
In another instance, unnecessary litigation arose because of a lack 
of communication between the Service Center and an NRSA-trainee. 
Roughly ten years after Stephani Boykin received an NRSA, the IRS 
withheld her spouse’s tax refund.90 She tried contacting the IRS, but 
the IRS did not help her resolve the matter.91 A case arose only to be 
 
 86.  Service Center Home Page, supra note 61.  
 87.  Cheng, 840 F. Supp. at 94–95. See supra Section III(B). 
 88.  See Cheng, 840 F. Supp. at 95.  
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Answer, United States v. Boykin, No. 6:08-CV-01306 (D. Kan. Dec. 15, 2008).  
 91.  Id. (“In my efforts to clarify the situation I called the phone numbers given to me by 
IRS correspondence. After talking with several representatives of government offices I was finally 
HECKER.MACRO.FINAL_2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2017  9:17 AM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 31 
286 
dismissed92 after Mrs. Boykin indicated that she had been teaching in 
conformity with the payback requirements.93 Because she had not re-
ceived any correspondence from the NIH after terminating her 
NRSA,94 she had not submitted the Annual Payback Activities Certifi-
cation form.95 Situations like this could easily be avoided by adminis-
tering the payback requirement in a more consistent manner. 
D. Nothing is Being Done to Remove the Payback Requirement 
from the Statute 
The payback provision is an unnecessary requirement that has 
been negatively affecting postdocs for over forty years.96 Perhaps one 
reason nothing has been done is because people seem to perceive 
NRSAs akin to student loans. For example, a former president of the 
Association of American Medical Colleges referred to postdocs as “stu-
dents” in a letter that was included in a congressional report of the 
legislation that created the NRSA program.97 Similarly, a 2006 law re-
view article cited United States v. Cheng in support of a statement 
about “student loans.”98 Further, the money that a postdoc is required 
to pay back after failing to complete acceptable payback service has 
been referred to as a “debt.”99 
For student loans, a service repayment option is generous and 
makes sense. In such cases, instead of paying off a loan, a debtor has 
 
told by a frustrated employee that in all actuality I was not able to change anything with respect 
to my ‘severely delinquent account’ because it was ‘too late’. When I asked what I was supposed 
to do I was told that I would have to wait for legal proceedings to start and present my case 
then.”). 
 92.  Order to Dismiss, United States v. Boykin, No. 6:08-CV-01306 (D. Kan. Mar. 16, 
2009). 
 93.  Answer, United States v. Boykin, No. 6:08-CV-01306 (D. Kan. Dec. 15, 2008). 
 94.  Id. Note that although she changed addresses several times, the IRS was able to keep 
up with her so she couldn’t have been that slippery.  
 95.  Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Boykin, No. 6:08-CV-01306 (D. Kan. Mar. 12, 
2009); See APAC, supra note 62. 
 96.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 12, at 6 (indicating 
that the NRSA program was created 1974, and that it contained a payback requirement from its 
inception).  
 97.  S. REP. No. 93-381, at 21–22 (1973) (letter of John Cooper, discussing fellowships of 
“postdoctoral students”). 
 98.  Bobby L. Dexter, Transfiguration of the Deadbeat Dad and the Greedy Octogenar-
ian: An Intratextualist Critique of Tax Refund Seizures, 54 U. Kan. L. Rev. 643, 666 (2006) (cit-
ing United States v. Cheng, 840 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Cal. 1993)); see supra Section III(B). 
 99.  Complaint, United States v. Boykin, No. 6:08-CV-01306 (D. Kan. Oct. 14, 2008); 
Complaint, United States v. Waid, No. 0:07-CV-00762 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2007); Cheng, 840 F. 
Supp. at 94–95. 
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the option of providing public service. However, a fellowship with a 
payback requirement is different from a student loan that is used to pay 
for tuition. Here, a postdoc comes into a position as an employee ex-
pecting a salary, and ends up leaving with an obligation that is more 
than he or she bargained for. The amount that postdocs are compen-
sated is already low in comparison to their degree of training.100 As one 
writer put it, “[i]magine working for less than $16.00 an hour with 
minimal fringe benefits and little job security. It may not sound that 
bad in an economy where 8.0 percent of the labor force is unemployed, 
but if you are a 30-something-year-old PhD, it is not a good return on 
your 7-year investment in graduate education.”101 To then take back a 
postdoc’s stipend that was initially given merely as “a subsistence al-
lowance to help defray living expenses”102 adds insult to injury.103 
Perhaps another reason nothing has been done to help postdocs is 
that most postdocs do not have problems fulfilling the payback re-
quirement. In defending the payback requirement, one person com-
mented before Congress that it is “not onerous.”104 Similarly, the NIH 
states that “[f]or most trainees, payback is easily accomplished.”105 But 
what about the postdocs who do have problems fulfilling the require-
ments? Just because the majority of postdocs pursue careers in research 
and teaching does not necessarily mean that it should be a requirement 
for all postdocs. Is the “relative ease”106 with which the requirements 
may be fulfilled keeping us from seeing that the requirements are un-
necessary? 
Although it is easy to technically fulfill the payback requirements 
 
 100.  See Weissmann, supra note 32. 
 101.  Stephan, supra note 29, at 245. 
 102.  NIH Policy Statement, supra note 17, § 11.3.8.2. 
 103.  Another person noted differences between students and postdocs as follows: “A post-
doc is a job that does not result in any degree, education, or certification. This isn’t graduate 
school . . . . Postdocs in this funding climate are recruited for the skills they already possess. They 
don’t get to choose their postdoc based upon what they want or need to learn. I receive no more 
training than my peers funded on R01’s who have no payback obligation and get full employee 
benefits. As a matter of fact, it is part of my job to train technicians, graduate students, medical 
residents, and undergrads— none of whom have payback obligations of any sort.” MLC, supra 
note 69. 
 104.  Quality of Health Care—Human Experimentation, 1973: Hearings on S. 2071, S. 
2072, and H.R. 7724 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare 
U.S. S., 93d Cong. 1321 (1973) [hereinafter Quality of Health Care Hearings] (statement of Eu-
gene Braunwald, M.D., Chairman of Medicine, Peter Bent Brigham Hospital). 
 105.  “Payback” under the National Research Service Award (NRSA), supra note 71. 
 106.  Id. 
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by remaining as an NRSA-trainee for a second year, becoming a pro-
fessor is much more difficult.107 The number of postdocs has increased 
over the years, but the number of jobs as professors has remained 
steady, and in some places, has even decreased.108 We cannot hope for 
every postdoc who receives an NRSA to become a professor. If the goal 
is to help postdocs become independent researchers,109 then we should 
assess whether the payback agreement actually helps to achieve this 
goal rather than merely focusing on whether fulfilling the requirement 
is easy. 
IV.  LEGAL ISSUES THAT ARISE DUE TO THE PAYBACK 
AGREEMENT 
In this section, I examine some legal issues implicated by the pay-
back agreement, including whether the payback agreement should be 
enforced under contract law, and whether its enforcement conflicts 
with minimum wage laws. 
A. Is the Payback Agreement an Enforceable Contract?110 
The validity of the payback agreement as a contract has not been 
examined in court. However, in similar situations, courts have held 
that where a statute gives authority to an agency to create an agree-
ment, statutory principles rather than contract principles govern the 
enforceability of the agreement.111 Through such reasoning, courts ig-
nore contract common law principles, and almost always hold in favor 
of the government by giving Chevron112 deference to the government’s 
side of the “agreement.” 
For example, in United States v. Citrin, the Ninth Circuit found 
 
 107.  See supra Section II(B); Richard Harris, Too Few University Jobs for America’s 
Young Scientists, NPR (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2014/09/16/343539024/too-few-university-jobs-for-americas-young-scientists; Johnson, 
supra note 25; Powell, supra note 24, at 146. 
 108.  Powell, supra note 24, at 144. 
 109.  NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH WORKFORCE WORKING 
GROUP REPORT 9 (June 14, 2012) (“[T]he working group believes that the postdoctoral experi-
ence be considered an extension of the training period primarily intended for those Ph.D. grad-
uates who intend to pursue research-intensive careers.”). 
 110.  Perhaps the real question here is, “Should the Payback Agreement be an Enforceable 
Contract?” because as we will see below, courts seem unlikely to address contract validity con-
cerns.  
 111.  United States v. Citrin, 972 F.2d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1992).  
 112.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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that the United States was entitled to recover from a medical doctor 
who failed to perform a service obligation that he incurred by receiving 
a National Health Service Corps (“NHSC”) scholarship during medi-
cal school.113 Individuals who receive NHSC scholarships must sign 
contracts to serve in health professional shortage areas after medical 
school, and the doctor had agreed to this obligation as part of his schol-
arship application.114 The court reasoned that “statutory principles, 
not contract principles, govern the relationship between the Secretary 
and the scholarship recipient. Thus, contract defenses . . . cannot pro-
vide a defense for Citrin.”115 The court further reasoned, “[w]e will 
uphold an agency’s decision unless it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law.”116 
In thus applying Chevron deference to agency-made contracts, a 
court might simplistically hold in favor of the agency because the doc-
trine suggests that an agency’s interpretation of a statute should be 
struck down only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary 
to the statute.”117 This highly disfavors the postdoc because it gives 
great weight to the government in interpreting the terms of its own 
contract. 
Further, under Seminole Rock and Auer, an agency’s interpreta-
tion of its own regulations is “controlling unless plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.”118 Therefore, if a court applies this 
doctrine to the NIH’s interpretation of what is considered health-re-
lated research, health-related research training, or health-related 
 
 113.  Citrin, 972 F.2d at 1046, 1050.  
 114.  Id. at 1046 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 254(b)–(f) (1988)) (“All applicants must submit signed 
written contracts agreeing to serve their periods of obligated service in an HMSA. The statute 
specifies the terms to be included in the contract.”). 
 115.  Id. at 1049 (citations omitted). 
 116.  Id.; see also United States v. Hatcher, 922 F.2d 1402, 1406–07 (9th Cir. 1991) (reject-
ing contract principles for HMSA scholarships even though the statute authorizing them uses the 
word, “contract”). 
 117.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. Of course, under Chevron, the arbitrary or capricious 
standard applies where Congress explicitly delegates authority, while a reasonableness standard 
applies when the delegation is implicit. Id. at 844. Here, courts would likely assume the arbitrary 
or capricious standard because 42 U.S.C. § 288(c)(3) explicitly delegates authority to the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services to “by regulation prescribe the type of research and teaching 
in which an individual may engage to comply with such requirement and such other requirements 
respecting research and teaching as the Secretary considers appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 288(c)(3) 
(2012).  
 118.  Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 
325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). 
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teaching119 in its payback agreement, the government’s side of the pay-
back contract would receive even greater weight than under Chev-
ron.120 It seems that any agency contract—where the agency can define 
the terms of the contract in a regulation or in the agency’s interpreta-
tion of its own regulation—has the propensity for misuse by the agency 
because it gives such great deference to the government’s interpreta-
tion of the contract. 
One such instance was in United States v. Cheng.121 The case arose 
after the NIH decided that John Cheng’s past teaching in an elemen-
tary school was not sufficiently health-related.122 The Court refused to 
apply contract principles, and cited Citrin in stating that “[s]tatutory 
principles [not contract principles] govern the relationship between 
the parties.”123 The Court then applied an “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard to the agency’s interpretation of “health-related,” to hold in 
favor of the NIH.124 
Because of the one-sided nature of contract interpretation under 
Chevron and other deference models, such extreme deference should 
be avoided when interpreting the payback agreement. Although sec-
tion 288(c) of 42 U.S.C explicitly grants authority to “the Secretary” 
to “by regulation prescribe the type of research and teaching” that 
complies with the payback requirement,125 courts should limit their 
deference by applying a strict reading to this statute. Such a reading 
would avoid giving deference to any aspect of the payback agreement 
other than the NIH’s interpretation (which by regulation is included 
in 42 C.F.R. part 66.110)126 of what qualifies as health-related research 
 
 119.  This wording is from the payback agreement, but these terms are defined in a policy 
statement by the NIH. NIH Policy Statement, supra note 17, § 11.4.3.1.1; Payback Agreement, 
supra note 2. This policy statement would likely be considered the NIH’s interpretation of its 
own regulation (under Auer and Seminole Rock deference) that states, “Each individual who re-
ceives an Award for postdoctoral research or training shall engage in a month of research training, 
research, or teaching that is health-related (or any combination thereof) for each month of sup-
port received, up to a maximum of twelve months.” 42 C.F.R. § 66.110(a) (2014). 
 120.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Su-
preme Court Treatments of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1099 (2008) (showing that the Supreme Court gives greater deference to agency 
decisions when applying Seminole Rock deference than Chevron deference). 
 121.  United States v. Cheng, 840 F. Supp. 93, 93 (N.D. Cal. 1993); see supra Section 
III(B).  
 122.  Id. at 94. 
 123.  Id.   
 124.  Id. at 94–95.  
 125.  42 U.S.C. § 288(c)(3) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 126.  42 C.F.R. § 66.110(a) (2014).  
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and teaching. The court should then avoid extending deference to the 
NIH’s definitions in its Policy Statement127 as an interpretation of its 
own regulation because unlike 42 C.F.R. part 66.110, the Policy State-
ment is not a “regulation” as the statute calls for.128 This would enable 
those treated unfairly to bring contract challenges and defenses. 
Further, courts should allow contract principles to apply to pay-
back agreement disputes unless Congress explicitly repudiates contract 
principles in the NRSA context. For example, the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas concluded that “a legislative act will not be construed as over-
ruling a principle of common law unless it is made plain by the act that 
such a change in the established law was intended [by the legisla-
ture].”129 The court cited another case which stated, “[a]ny statute in 
derogation of the common law will be strictly construed.”130 This rea-
soning makes sense because it is contrary to accepted principles of stat-
utory interpretation to assume that Congress intends to displace com-
mon law principles without explicitly acknowledging it. Although this 
reasoning was made in a state court, we should expect an agency of the 
United States to abide by state contract laws when entering into con-
tracts with citizens of various states. 
If courts would consider the payback agreement under contract 
principles, how would they rule on its validity? In this subsection, I 
begin by analyzing whether the way the payback agreement is admin-
istered satisfies contract requirements of offer, acceptance, and consid-
eration. I then consider whether disparate bargaining power makes the 
payback agreement an adhesion contract that should not be enforced 
even if it is technically valid. I then end this subsection by discussing 
the payback agreement in the context of non-compete agreement pol-
icies. I do not compare the payback obligation to eighteenth century 
indentured servitude, but if I did, I would not be the first to do so.131 
 
 127.  NIH Policy Statement, supra note 17, § 11.4.3.1.1. 
 128.  42 U.S.C. § 288(c)(3). This would prevent the NIH from being able to usurp Semi-
nole Rock and Auer deference by merely restating the statute (42 U.S.C. § 288(c)) in the regula-
tion (42 C.F.R. § 66.110) and then claiming such deference to its own interpretation of the reg-
ulation in the NIH Policy Statement. Supra note 17, § 11.4.3.1.1. A court may thereby limit its 
deference to the NIH and give a postdoc a fair chance in explaining himself or herself in how he 
or she interpreted the payback requirements.  
 129.  Nelson v. Ark. Rural Med. Practice Loan & Scholarship Bd., 385 S.W.3d 762, 767–
68 (Ark. 2011).  
 130.  Books-A-Million, Inc. v. Ark. Painting & Specialties Co., 10 S.W.3d 857, 859 (Ark. 
2000). 
 131.  In Congressional hearings, the payback provision was called the “‘indenture’ provi-
sion,” and one person stated, “We frown upon long-term indentures that might assure the inves-
tor of gaining a return: Bond service is a relic of another century.” National Health Research 
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1. Negotiation: offer and acceptance 
Here, we return to the fictional Dr. Wormtongue.132 In his case, 
the payback agreement itself does not indicate any clear offer and ac-
ceptance. Although Dr. Wormtongue signed the agreement, he was 
the only party to sign it. Unlike, for example, his postdoc offer letter 
that was signed by Professor Saruman prior to being sent to Dr. 
Wormtongue, neither the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
nor the Secretary’s representative signed the payback agreement form 
prior to sending it to Dr. Wormtongue. Likewise, the payback agree-
ment does not contain an explicit offer by the government to provide 
anything to the postdoc. It merely states that the postdoc certifies that 
he or she has read and understood, and will abide by the terms.133 Sign-
ing the payback agreement might be construed as an acceptance by the 
postdoc, but what offer is the postdoc accepting? Although the first 
heading in the payback agreement states, “this agreement is a required 
condition of award,”134 a condition is not a promise. 
Despite the lack of mutual promises on the face of the payback 
agreement, offer and acceptance are likely to be inferred by the subse-
quent course of performance.135 Signing the payback agreement may 
actually be construed as an offer by the postdoc that the Secretary ac-
cepts by granting NRSA funding. Also, although it is a stretch, one 
might argue that all negotiations between Congress and its constitu-
ents that have led to the statutory delegation of the Secretary to create 
the payback terms could be construed as forming an intent to contract 
on the part of the government with any postdoc who accepts these ob-
ligations.136 Overall, offer and acceptance concerns probably do not 
threaten the payback agreement’s validity. 
 
Fellowship and Traineeship Act of 1973: Hearings on H.R. 5640 and H.R. 5948 Before the Sub-
comm. on Pub. Health and Env’t of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce H.R., 93d 
Cong. 95, 164 (1973) [hereinafter NRSA Fellowship Hearings] (statements of Dr. Charles A. 
Janeway, Professor of Pediatrics, Harvard Medical School, and Physician-in-Chief, Children’s 
Hospital Medical Center; and Joshua Lederberg, Ph.D., Chairman, Department of Genetics, 
Stanford University School of Medicine). 
 132.  See supra Introduction.  
 133.  Payback Agreement, supra note 2.  
 134.  Id.  
 135.  U.C.C. § 1-303(a) (2013). 
 136.  See generally Robert S. Pasley, The Interpretation of Government Contracts: A Plea 
for Better Understanding, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 211, 214 (1956) (“[The Government contract] 
is the result of a long process of negotiation and bargaining, although one which of necessity 
takes place on an over-all rather than an individual basis.”). 
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2. Consideration 
Consideration may be more of an issue for the payback agree-
ment’s contractual validity. Although the NRSA provides funding, and 
the postdoc provides labor and promises to fulfill the payback require-
ment, it is not clear that this exchange represents any real bargain be-
tween two parties. Further, the payback agreement may lack consider-
ation if it is not signed as part of an employment contract. This 
subsection will discuss these issues. 
For consideration to be valid, it must be bargained for.137 In this 
context, we ask if both parties are motivated by an exchange of value.138 
In other words, for a contract to be valid, each party must be induced 
to give up something by what the other party gives up. From the post-
doc’s perspective, there is no real benefit incurred by receiving NRSA 
funding when the postdoc’s PI has already agreed to pay the postdoc’s 
salary. In such a situation, can we really say that a postdoc is being 
induced to sign the payback agreement by any new benefit? 
Next, it is possible that the anticipation of payback obligations in-
duces the United States to grant NRSAs to postdocs, but it is not clear. 
In granting NRSA funds, the United States is probably not motivated 
merely by the labor that postdocs perform while they are NRSA-
trainees.139 The motivation was to train enough scientists to fulfill the 
nation’s research needs, as evinced by the NRSA program’s purpose.140 
What this means is that the United States is interested in training fu-
ture independent researchers. Thus, it is possible that the United 
States is motivated to grant NRSAs in exchange for an apparent 
demonstration (in the form of a payback agreement) that a postdoc is 
 
 137.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1) (1981). 
 138.  Id. § 71(2). 
 139.  Although such a conclusion may be valid as postdocs’ numbers increase and they do 
more and more of the work in the laboratory. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L 
ACADS., supra note 15, at viii (“[T]o a significant degree, the value of the trainees supported by 
the NIH lies more with their current research output while they are trainees than with their 
future career development.”).  
 140.  National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348 § 102 (1974) (stating that Congress’s pur-
pose in instituting the NRSA program was “to increase the capability of the [NIH] . . . to carry 
out their responsibility of maintaining a superior national program of research,” which “depends 
on the availability of excellent scientists.”); H.R. REP. No. 97-208, at 804 (1981) (Conf. Rep.) 
(“[T]he Conferees feel obligated to clarify their intent regarding the primary purpose of the 
NRSA program. National Research Service Awards are not made for the purposes of receiving 
services designated by the grantor. Rather the payback requirement offers benefits to the nation 
from the participation of NRSA recipients in the research enterprise. . . . [T]he Committee does 
not believe that the payback requirement is a quid pro quo . . . .”); NIH Policy Statement, supra 
note 17, § 11.3.3.3. 
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inclined toward a future research career, but this conclusion is not def-
inite. 
On the other hand, the United States can continue to train inde-
pendent researchers and fulfill its research needs without the payback 
requirement.141 Would Congress have refused to create NRSA fellow-
ships if a payback requirement was not included? It does not appear 
that anyone in Congress ever demanded that the provision be added. 
Instead, it was part of the bill as first introduced in the House of Rep-
resentatives,142 and has since been substantively modified only to de-
crease its severity.143 Thus, the United States is probably not really in-
duced to grant NRSAs to postdocs in return for their payback 
obligations. 
Further, some states hold that employee contracts (such as non-
compete and non-disclosure agreements) lack consideration unless 
they are entered into before employment begins.144 The payback 
agreement is generally not signed as part of an employment contract. 
In Dr. Wormtongue’s case,145 he and Professor Saruman entered into 
an employer-employee relationship long before Dr. Wormtongue re-
ceived an NRSA. Although the University of Isengard was technically 
Dr. Wormtongue’s employer, Professor Saruman acted on behalf of 
the university in offering him employment, supervision, and funding. 
They had a clear agreement in which Professor Saruman promised to 
employ Dr. Wormtongue for one year and pay him an annual salary of 
$42,840. Thus, employment had already begun when Dr. 
Wormtongue signed the payback agreement. 
In spite of this argument, it might be possible to conclude that Dr. 
Wormtongue switched employers when he agreed to receive NRSA 
 
 141.  As evidence of this statement, I refer to the overabundance of postdocs and fierce 
competition for independent research positions described in Section II(B).  
 142.  National Biomedical Research Fellowship, Traineeship, and Training Act of 1973, 
H.R. 7724, 93d Cong. § 455(c) (May 10, 1973). 
 143.  In particular, the payback period originally lasted two years, but has since been 
changed to one year. National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348 § 102 (1974); 42 U.S.C. § 288(c) 
(2012). Additionally, the requirement originally extended to student NRSA-trainees, but now 
applies to only postdocs. Id.; Historical Payback Reporting Requirements (Prior to June 10, 
1993), supra note 46. 
 144.  National Survey on Restrictive Covenants 17, FOX ROTHSCHILD, http://www.fox-
rothschild.com/content/uploads/2015/05/National-Survey-on-Restrictive-Covenants-Septem-
ber-2016.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2015); see STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 467 (3d ed. 2009) (“If an employer institutes a program and re-
quires present employees to sign on, courts have held that there is no consideration for the non-
disclosure agreement.”). 
 145.  See supra Section I: Introduction. 
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funds. If so, then he would technically be signing the payback agree-
ment before initiating his new employment. However, when granting 
NRSA funds, the NIH does not administer an employment contract 
to work for the United States. On the contrary, the NIH is quite clear 
that NRSA funds are not a salary, but are merely a stipend meant to 
help defray living costs.146 Further, the NIH states, “Kirschstein-
NRSA awards are not provided as a condition of employment with ei-
ther the Federal government or the recipient.”147 
3. Disparate bargaining power: a contract of adhesion 
The biggest contractual issue for the payback agreement is that it 
is an adhesion contract. “Adhesion contracts do not ‘issue from that 
freedom in bargaining and equality of bargaining which are the theo-
retical parents of the American law of contracts.’”148 Although this is 
more of a policy concern than of contractual validity since adhesion 
contracts are not necessarily unconscionable (a defense under contract 
law),149 decision-makers should take it into account in determining 
whether to enforce the payback agreement. 
An adhesion contract is “one that is drafted unilaterally by the 
dominant party and then presented on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis to 
the weaker party who has no real opportunity to bargain about its 
terms.”150 This definition has three apparent aspects: unilateral draft-
ing, dominant and weaker parties, and a lack of any real opportunity to 
bargain about its terms. 
Applying this definition, the payback agreement has been unilat-
erally drafted. The agreement was written under the authority of the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services,151 and imposes uniform re-
quirements on all postdocs throughout the United States. 
Next, there is a dominant party and a weaker party. Arguably, no 
party is stronger than the United States. At another level, the postdoc’s 
PI is typically the one who asks the postdoc to be on a training grant. 
Because the postdoc’s PI is usually the postdoc’s supervisor and is 
 
 146.  NIH Policy Statement, supra note 17, at § 11.3.8.2. 
 147.  Id. § 11.3.8.7. 
 148.  Sierra David Sterkin, Comment: Challenging Adhesion Contracts in California: A 
Consumer’s Guide, 34 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. L. REV. 285, 290–91 (2004) (quoting Neal v. State 
Farm Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (Ct. App. 1961)).  
 149.  U.C.C. § 2-302 (2013). 
 150.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. b (1971).  
 151.  See 42 U.S.C. § 288(c)(3) (2012). 
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looked up to as the postdoc’s employer, a typical postdoc is cautious to 
avoid doing anything to displease him or her. By refusing to sign the 
payback agreement and receive training grant funds, a postdoc may 
find himself or herself looking for a new job. Job searching is made 
even more difficult for a postdoc who does not get along with his or 
her PI because a strong recommendation from the postdoc’s PI is par-
amount to receiving another job offer.152 Sometimes, a professor will 
choose his or her next postdoc based solely on the potential postdoc’s 
recommendation. 
Third, the postdoc does not have any real opportunity to bargain 
about the terms of the payback agreement. Because the payback agree-
ment is given to the postdoc on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, he or she 
does not have a chance to change any of its terms. Therefore, the pay-
back agreement is administered as an adhesion contract. 
One potentially redeeming quality of the payback agreement is 
that a payback obligation may be deferred or waived due to impossi-
bility or where “[f]ulfillment would involve a substantial hardship and 
the enforcement of such obligation would be against equity and good 
conscience.”153 However, the good conscience clause probably only 
holds the government to what would normally be required under con-
tract law regardless of whether it was included. This is because courts 
do not normally enforce contracts that are against equity and good 
conscience whether or not a good conscience clause is included.154 
4. Non-compete agreements 
Payback agreements are like non-compete agreements. A non-
compete agreement indicates that a person will refrain from working 
in a certain industry. The NRSA payback agreement indicates that a 
person will work in a particular industry, or in other words, that a per-
son will refrain from working in all industries except for the prescribed 
industry. Thus, a payback agreement is like a non-compete agreement 
but is farther-reaching in that it obligates the postdoc to refrain from 
 
 152.  Laura Bonetta, Advice for Beginning Faculty: How to Find the Best Postdoc, SCI. 
CAREERS (Feb. 6, 2009), http://sciencecareers.sciencemag.org/career_magazine/previous_is-
sues/articles/2009_02_06/science.opms.r0900065 (“Many lab heads say that the most important 
component of a postdoc application is the letters of recommendation.”); Livia Puljak, Career 
Blocker: Bad Advisors, SCI. CAREERS (Jan. 13, 2006), http://sciencecareers.sciencemag.org/ca-
reer_magazine/previous_issues/articles/2006_01_13/nodoi.9522592743045586763 (“Letters of 
recommendation are so important that a bad one from an advisor could ruin their career.”). 
 153.  Payback Agreement, supra note 2 (emphasis added). 
 154.  U.C.C. § 2-302 (2013). 
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more industries than a typical non-compete agreement. 
California and some other states prohibit non-compete agree-
ments.155 In California, a person could sue his or her employer for 
merely asking the person to sign a non-compete agreement.156 In ex-
plaining the reasoning behind this policy, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia declared, “[e]very individual possesses as a form of property, the 
right to pursue any calling, business or profession he may choose.”157 
Many state bars also acknowledge that non-compete agreements 
are against public policy because they adversely impact third parties. 
Even though non-compete agreements are legal in many states, it is 
against those states’ rules of professional conduct for attorneys to agree 
not to solicit clients after they leave a law firm.158 These rules prohibit 
solicitation of clients because it is unethical to do anything that is not 
in the clients’ best interests. Like clients whose best interests are in 
having attorneys available to work for them, the general population’s 
best interest is in having trained scientists available in the job market. 
There is evidence that California’s ban on non-compete contracts 
has played a role in its economic prosperity.159 On the other hand, lim-
iting employee mobility carries social costs that translate into eco-
nomic losses.160 Adverse effects of enforcing non-compete agreements 
 
 155.  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 (2016) (“Except as provided in this chapter, every 
contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of 
any kind is to that extent void.”). 
 156.  Lisa Guerin, Understanding Noncompete Agreements, NOLO, 
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/understanding-noncompete-agreements.html (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2015).  
 157.  Cont’l Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley, 148 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1944). 
 158.  Robert M. Wilcox, Enforcing Lawyer Non-Competition Agreements While Main-
taining the Profession: The Role of Conflict of Interest Principles, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 915, 915–
16 (2000); see e.g., Dean R. Dietrich, Ethics: No Noncompete Agreements for Lawyers, 85 WIS. 
LAW. 4 (2012), http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/arti-
cle.aspx?Volume=85&Issue=4&ArticleID=2393.  
 159.  Prasanna Tambe & Lorin M. Hitt, Job Hopping, Information Technology Spillovers, 
and Productivity Growth, 60 MGMT. SCI. 338, 339, 352 (2014) (“[A] substantial amount of vari-
ation in IT returns can be explained by productivity spillovers generated by IT labor flows . . . . 
[L]abor market flexibility may play an important role in explaining cross-country IT-related 
productivity differentials . . . .”); see also On Amir & Orly Lobel, Innovation Motivation: Behav-
ioral Effects of Post-Employment Restrictions (June 30, 2011),  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1876133 (“[M]obility of personnel among firms provides a way of spreading 
information.”) (quoting KENNETH J. ARROW, ECONOMICS WELFARE AND THE ALLOCATION 
OF RESOURCES FOR INVENTION 619 (1962)); Natalie Kitroeff, Silicon Valley Is the World’s 
Innovation Capital Because of a Technicality, BLOOMBERG BUS., Mar. 17, 2015, 7:25 AM) 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-17/silicon-valley-is-the-world-s-innova-
tion-capital-because-of-a-technicality.  
 160.  David A. Price, Does Enforcement of Employee Noncompete Agreements Impede 
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include limiting the diffusion of knowledge between companies 
(“knowledge spillovers”), limiting pooling of skilled workers, suppress-
ing wages, and deterring people from founding valuable spinoff com-
panies.161 Decreasing postdoc mobility by enforcing payback agree-
ments is likely to result in similar adverse consequences. The idea of 
stifling creativity and bolstering control is based on old, outdated no-
tions, and it is unlikely that these negative impacts are worth any ben-
efit that may be derived from enforcing such agreements.162 
Many states allow non-compete agreements,163 but use a reasona-
bleness standard to determine when they are enforceable. For example, 
in Texas, non-compete clauses are required to contain reasonable lim-
itations “as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be re-
strained,” and must “not impose a greater restraint than is necessary to 
protect” the employer’s legitimate business interests.164 Based on this 
standard, it seems likely that a covenant to not work for one year, an-
ywhere, in any industry except for biomedical research or teaching, 
would be invalid. Although a year is likely to be reasonable,165  the 
scope of activity and geographical area would be far too vast because it 
covers all activities anywhere in the world that do not fall within the 
definition of health-related research or teaching.166 Although the 
United States has a legitimate business interest in seeking to develop a 
highly trained workforce to promote the nation’s biomedical research 
agenda,167 the restraint is unnecessary. There are plenty of highly 
trained postdocs available to perform research and teaching. In fact, 
there are many more postdocs than available research jobs.168 Thus, 
the payback agreement would be unlikely to pass the reasonableness 
test in a state like Texas. 
 
the Development of Industry Clusters? 2 (Nov. 2014), https://www.richmondfed.org/-/me-
dia/richmondfedorg/publications/research/economic_brief/2014/pdf/eb_14-11.pdf. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE 
LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 32 (2013) (quoting WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 371 (2003)). 
 163.  See National Survey on Restrictive Covenants, supra note 144. 
 164.  Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code § 15.50(a) (1969). 
 165.  See, e.g., Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. 2011) (enforcing a two-
year non-compete clause). 
 166.  See Mark J. Oberti, 2013 Update: Texas Noncompete Law, Trade Secrets Litigation, 
the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, and Fiduciary Duties 1, 21–25, 30–32, http://www.osattor-
neys.com/pdf/presentations_63_3657626730.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).  
 167.  NIH Policy Statement, supra note 17, § 11.3.3.3. 
 168.  Powell, supra note 24, at 146 (stating that only 15–20% of postdocs obtain tenure-
track academic positions in the United States); Weissmann, supra note 32. 
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Even when a non-compete agreement is narrow in scope, some 
states may decline to enforce it if it negatively impacts third parties.169 
The payback agreement and the policy behind it discourage scientists 
from working in other fields besides research or teaching. This policy 
is counterproductive because if postdocs would seek employment in 
sectors other than research, they could have an invigorating effect on 
the economy. Having a Ph.D. is highly prized in non-traditional, non-
research areas such as business consulting170 and patent law.171 Com-
panies in Silicon Valley are known to benefit from knowledge spillo-
vers,172 and industries everywhere may likewise benefit from access to 
postdocs. 
B. Does Enforcing the Payback Agreement Conflict with 
Minimum Wage Laws? 
As explained in Section II(B), postdocs generally start as university 
employees with salaries and regular full-time benefits. Universities 
commonly hire postdocs under one-year contracts that ensure that 
they will be paid and make it difficult for them to be fired.173 Postdocs 
do not pay tuition for their training, and are not students. When a 
postdoc receives NRSA support, his or her salary generally remains the 
same but is called a stipend, and instead of being considered an em-
ployee, he or she is considered a fellow. Although this may be techni-
cally different, to the postdoc it merely amounts to a change in title 
and funding source. 
Minimum wages are set by federal and state governments to make 
sure workers earn enough to live on.174 Effective July 24, 2009, the Fair 
 
 169.  MCJOHN, supra note 144, at 468 (“A noncompete clause that has adverse conse-
quences for third parties or is contrary to public policy may not be enforced, even if very narrow 
in scope.”); see, e.g., Radio One, Inc. v. Wooten, 452 F. Supp. 2d 754, 757 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
 170.  For example, top consulting firm McKinsey & Co. actively recruits postdocs from top 
biomedical research universities. See Other PhD and Post Doctoral Schools, MCKINSEY & CO., 
http://www.mckinsey.com/careers/your_career/mckinsey_on_cam-
pus/schools/apd/other_phds_and_post_doctorates (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).  
 171.  Robert Hagan, Getting Started with Patent Law, BIOCAREERS, http://bio-
careers.com/resource/getting-started-patent-law (last visited Nov. 21, 2015) (stating that people 
with Ph.D.s in life sciences possess the critical training necessary to fulfill the intellectual prop-
erty needs of biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies). 
 172.  See On Amir & Orly Lobel, supra note 159, at 13; Kitroeff, supra note 159; Tambe 
& Hitt, supra note 159, at 339. 
 173.  For example, this was my experience as a postdoc at UCSF. 
 174.  Frances Coppola, Why We Need a Minimum Wage, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2014, 10:06 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2014/01/13/why-we-need-a-minimum-
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Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) set the national minimum wage to 
$7.25 per hour.175 This wage applies to federal and state employees, as 
well as non-government employees.176 Additionally, the NIH has set a 
minimum wage for postdocs at $42,840 per year.177 Accordingly, post-
docs expect to receive this amount. However, when a postdoc has to 
pay back his or her stipend, it is as if he or she was never paid. 
As mentioned in Section III(A)(2), the NIH has stated that an 
NRSA is not an employee of the federal government or the grantee 
(the granting institution).178 However, for purposes of minimum wage 
laws, there are only employees and volunteers, with no in-between 
classification.179 
Interns who work for free are classified under the FLSA as volun-
teers.180 Although one might try to argue that postdocs are like volun-
teer interns, they are not. To be considered a volunteer under the 
FLSA, an individual must offer his or her services “freely and without 
pressure or coercion, direct or implied, from an employer.”181 The 
NIH might argue that a postdoc’s stipend is merely a small amount 
meant to defray volunteer expenses.182 However, because postdocs 
start working for professors with an expectation of receiving at least 
$42,840 per year (an amount near the national salary average of 
 
wage/. 
 175.  Compliance Assistance - Wages and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/flsa/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). 
 176.  Policy Basics: The Minimum Wage, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, 
http://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/policy-basics-the-minimum-wage; History of Changes 
to the Minimum Wage Law, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/cover-
age.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).  
 177.  Ruth L. Kirschstein National Research Service Award (NRSA) Stipends, Tui-
tion/Fees and Other Budgetary Levels Effective for Fiscal Year 2015, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH 
(Dec. 30, 2014), https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-15-048.html. 
 178.  NIH Policy Statement, supra note 17, § 11.3.8.7.  
 179.  At least in the public sector (and since NRSA-recipients are not federal employees, 
they seem to be in the public sector). 29 C.F.R. §§ 553.100–01 (2015); Diane Juffras, Internships 
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, COATES’ CANONS: NC LOCAL GOV’T LAW (Mar. 19, 
2014), http://canons.sog.unc.edu/?p=7588 (“In the public sector, interns can be true volunteers 
or they can be employees. There is no legally in-between status”). 
 180.  § 553.101(a). 
 181.  § 553.101(c) (emphasis added); see Diane Juffras, supra note 179. 
 182.  NIH Policy Statement, supra note 17 § 11.3.8.2 (“Trainees generally are supported 
for 12-month full-time training appointments for which they receive a stipend as a subsistence 
allowance to help defray living expenses during the research training experience. The stipend is 
not ‘salary’ and is not provided as a condition of employment with either the Federal government 
or the recipient organization.”).  
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$47,230),183 it seems unreasonable to assume that they offer their ser-
vices freely. 
Further, because of the disparity of power between a postdoc and 
his or her PI, where the postdoc’s PI asks him or her to go on an NRSA 
training grant, the postdoc is arguably pressured184 or coerced by his 
or her employer into the “volunteer” position of paying back his or her 
stipend in response to non-compliance with the payback agreement. 
Therefore, even if postdocs were considered interns, having to pay 
back their stipends runs contrary to the FLSA. 
V.  IS THE PUBLIC SERVED BY THE PAYBACK REQUIREMENT? 
Requiring either a year of service or monetary repayment imposes 
a serious obligation on postdocs. For this reason, it should be placed 
on them only if it is justified by strong public policy. This section dis-
cusses the policies behind the payback requirement, and whether they 
justify the serious burden that it puts on postdocs. 
A. Reasons for Instituting the Payback Requirement 
In instituting the payback requirement, Congress relied on the tes-
timony of professors and researchers who thought it was a good idea. 
The legislature wanted to avoid wasting the United States’ resources 
by granting funding that did not coincide with the NRSA program’s 
purpose of ensuring that highly trained scientists would be available to 
fulfill the nation’s research agenda.185 To do this, Congress sought to 
recoup potential losses from those individuals who did not provide 
value to the United States by staying in biomedical research or teach-
ing. The legislature was also interested in disincentivizing people from 
accepting NRSAs if they did not plan to continue on in research ca-
reers. Particularly, the legislature was worried about giving NRSAs to 
people who would switch careers and make much larger salaries prac-
ticing medicine. Here, I provide legislative history statements that 
 
 183.  May 2014 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates United States, 
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Mar. 25, 2015),  http://www.bls.gov/oes/2014/may/oes_nat.htm. 
 184.  One former postdoc said in a forum discussion, “I had tried to turn down the fellow-
ship myself but was pressured into taking it by my mentor since it virtually made me a free post-
doc.” LMM, Resigning from a Post-doc, SCIENCE CAREERS (Mar. 13, 2008, 12:55 PM), 
http://scforum.sciencecareers.org/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=5783&p=39471&hilit=train-
ing+grant+payback#p39471. 
 185.  National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348 § 102, 88 Stat. 342 (1974); NIH Policy 
Statement, supra note 17, § 11.3.1. 
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demonstrated this reasoning. 
First, Congress instituted the payback requirement as a way of en-
suring that the United States would recoup its losses from those who 
did not provide value by staying in biomedical research or teaching. In 
a sub-committee hearing in the House of Representatives, Dr. John A. 
Cooper said, “Congress intends that those who benefit from this pro-
gram do enter into research and teaching in the academic health cen-
ters or else pay back the cost.”186 One congressman said the payback 
requirement would “assure that some individuals will not take ad-
vantage of the Federal funding and then fail to return any benefit to 
the taxpayers.”187 Similarly, in a subcommittee hearing before the Sen-
ate, Dr. Sherman Levine said that NRSA funds are “given to an indi-
vidual . . . on the expectation that he will be providing something of 
particular value.”188 Finally, another person summed up this line of 
thinking by saying, “it is vitally necessary today that any waste in this 
program be eliminated.”189 
Second, Congress sought to disincentivize scientists from accept-
ing NRSAs if they did not plan to continue on in research careers. Dr. 
Eugene Braunwald stated that the payback requirement “make[s] peo-
ple think twice about the direction they are going to go.”190 Another 
referred to the “generous funding of training and research,” and con-
sidered it to be an abuse of the NRSA program that some young people 
“went on into research training really because they didn’t know what 
they were going to do next.”191 The commenter explained that the pay-
back requirement “makes the candidate take his job seriously. He re-
ally has to be committed to research before he enters his training.”192 
In a similar vein, a medical professor presented a survey of whether 
young physicians would be deterred by the payback requirements from 
 
 186.  NRSA Fellowship Hearings, supra note 131, at 80 (statement of Dr. John A. Cooper, 
President, Association of American Medical Colleges).  
 187.  119 CONG. REC. H17, 467 (May 31, 1973) (statement of Mr. Nelsen). 
 188.  Quality of Health Care Hearings, supra note 104, at 1281 (statement of Sherman 
Levine, M.D., Research Fellow, Albert Einstein College of Medicine). 
 189.  NRSA Fellowship Hearings, supra note 131, at 80 (statement of Tim Lee Carter, 
Kentucky). 
 190.  Quality of Health Care Hearings, supra note 104, at 1321 (statement of Eugene 
Braunwald, M.D., Chairman of Medicine, Peter Bent Brigham Hospital). 
 191.  NRSA Fellowship Hearings, supra note 131, at 164 (statement of Dr. Charles A. Jane-
way, Professor of Pediatrics, Harvard Medical School, and Physician in Charge, Children’s Hos-
pital Medical Center). 
 192.  Id. 
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undertaking traineeships before a House of Representatives subcom-
mittee.193 Regarding the half of young physicians in the survey who 
expressed reluctance because of family obligations, the professor said 
that “this group is not that highly motivated to research and teach-
ing.”194 
Third, Congress was worried about wasting NRSA funds on peo-
ple who would switch careers to make much larger salaries practicing 
medicine. For example, in one subcommittee hearing, chairman Paul 
G. Rogers asked Dr. James Wyngaarden if “persons receiving training 
grants and fellowships” should “have to pay back the amounts they re-
ceive if they go into private practice,” and Dr. Wyngaarden said he 
agreed with that.195 In this hearing, Dr. Wyngaarden had spoken pos-
itively about the flexibility of allowing young trainees to pay back their 
stipends when they “change career goals early” and “discover that their 
talents are greater in medical practice than in research or teaching.”196 
Another professor wrote to Mr. Rogers, stating, “People who go on 
into medical practice, of course, generally make much larger incomes 
than [professors]. Many of them could afford to pay back substantial 
debts within a few years.”197 Mr. Rogers stated that Congress 
“wouldn’t support those” who “are going into clinic medicine or are 
going out into rich practice.”198 Thus, Congress seemed especially 
concerned with physicians who could afford to pay back their stipends 
after changing careers. 
 
 193.  Id. at 176 (statement of Dr. Ludwig W. Eichna, Association of Professors of Medi-
cine).  
 194.  Id.; see also Quality of Health Care Hearings, supra note 104, at 1280 (statement of 
Lawrence Beck, University of Pennsylvania Hospital) (“There are a number of us who go into 
training programs with firm convictions that this is what we want to do for our career. In other 
words, we are firmly convinced at that point that we want to stay in the academic careers. I think 
there are others who have not entirely made up their minds who go into it and many of whom 
will remain in academic research careers, but with the provisions for this payback that might not 
enter at this point.”). 
 195.  NRSA Fellowship Hearings, supra note 131, at 155 (statements of Dr. James 
Wyngaarden, Professor and Chairman, Department of Medicine, Duke University Medical Cen-
ter; and Paul G. Rogers, Chairman). 
 196.  Id. at 128 (statement of Dr. James Wyngaarden, Professor and Chairman, Depart-
ment of Medicine, Duke University Medical Center). Interestingly, Dr. Wyngaarden later 
changed his tune, and, in 1979, blamed “the reprehensible payback provision” as one of the rea-
sons for a declining interest in research among M.D. postdocs and medical students. James B. 
Wyngaarden, The Clinical Investigator as an Endangered Species, 301 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1254, 
1258–59 (1979).  
 197.  NRSA Fellowship Hearings, supra note 131, at 263–64 (letter of John T. Edsall, Pro-
fessor of Biochemistry). 
 198.  Id. at 57 (statement of Paul G. Rogers, Chairman). 
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Overall, Congress took a tough love approach toward its trainees. 
Although it was agreed that the funds were “generous,”199 those dis-
cussing the legislation at its conception clearly did not want to waste 
any money on anyone who would not continue in research or teaching. 
The bill’s subcommittee chairman noted that “for those who would go 
into research . . . it would be disastrous to move into alternative[] [ca-
reers].”200 Another person testified, “I think the man going into this 
training should assume some obligations for that training.”201 
B. Does Congress’s Reasoning Make Sense? 
As stated, Congress instituted the payback requirement to save 
money by funding only those who were likely to continue into research 
and teaching careers. Congress wanted to dissuade people from accept-
ing NRSA funds if they were not planning to stay in science, particu-
larly those who would change careers to go into medical practice. Do 
these rationales make sense? Here, I argue that they do not. 
The main rationale for instituting the payback requirement was to 
avoid wasting money funding anyone who would not spend a career in 
research or teaching. However, this argument backfires for those who 
are intolerant of spending excess funds. Instead of saving money, the 
NRSA program likely spends more money because of the payback re-
quirement. This is because most postdocs perform their payback ser-
vice by remaining as NRSA fellows for a second year.202 For postdocs 
who decide not to spend their careers in research before completing 
their second year of NRSA funding, they might have spared NRSA 
funds by leaving their fellowships early to go into their new careers. 
Instead, they are likely to remain as NRSA fellows for the full two years 
to avoid having to pay back their stipends. By staying on longer, they 
increase the amount of NRSA money spent on their training. 
Further, enforcing the payback requirement imposes costs on the 
 
 199.  Id. at 164 (statement of Dr. Charles A. Janeway, Professor of Pediatrics, Harvard 
Medical School, and Physician-in-Charge, Children’s Hospital Medical Center). 
 200.  Id. at 57 (statement of Paul G. Rogers, Chairman). 
 201.  Id. at 177 (statement of Dr. Ludwig W. Eichna, Association of Professors of Medi-
cine). 
 202.  NIH Policy Statement, supra note 17, § 11.4.2 (“the 13th and subsequent months of 
postdoctoral NRSA supported research training serves to pay back this obligation month by 
month.”); Judith Podskalny, Training, Career Development, and Small Business Support from 
the National Institutes of Health, 49 GASTROINTESTINAL ENDOSCOPY S96, S96 (1999) (“The 
NIH strongly encourages fellows to remain on Institutional training grants for a minimum of 2 
years.”). 
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United States. For example, it costs money to employ payback special-
ists in the NRSA Payback Service Center, and to monitor postdocs’ 
payback activities. When the requirement was discontinued for pre-
doctoral students in 1993, the NIH acknowledged that the cost of 
monitoring payback is not justified for predoctoral students.203 It 
stated, “[t]he NIH thinks that a research career is so likely a career 
outcome for individuals who have received predoctoral research train-
ing that the obligation serves no useful purpose. In addition, the cost 
of monitoring service payback is not justified by the limited effect on 
career choices.”204 Could not the same be said for postdocs? 
As an example of unjustified costs in payback enforcement, a need-
less burden was placed on the IRS, courts, a prior NRSA-recipient, and 
the recipient’s spouse in United States v. Boykin.205 Ultimately, the 
litigation was unnecessary because the prior NRSA recipient had en-
gaged in, but not reported, her payback service. However, even if she 
had not engaged in acceptable service, the amount the United States 
sought to recover was only $12,068 plus interest.206 Does this small 
amount justify getting the Service Center, the IRS, and the courts in-
volved? All the costs of employing these groups seem unlikely to be 
worth the small amount sought in this case. 
Next, although it is understandable that Congress would want to 
dissuade people who do not plan to stay in science from accepting 
NRSAs, this rationale only works if postdocs are aware of the payback 
requirement and are not pressured to accept NRSAs by outside 
sources. Many postdocs are unaware of the requirement until after 
they agree with their PIs to be on training grants.207 Further, PIs are 
incentivized to put pressure on their postdocs to receive fellowships 
because an NRSA fellowship would remove the burden of paying a 
postdoc from a PI.208 Although a postdoc could refuse to accept an 
NRSA, doing so could damage the postdoc’s important relationship 
with his or her PI. This is especially so if the refusal is made when the 
postdoc finds out about the payback requirement after already agree-
 
 203.  S. REP. No. 103–2, at 56 (1993). 
 204.  Id.at 48–49.  
 205.  Answer, United States v. Boykin, No. 6:08-CV-01306 (D. Kan. Dec. 15, 2008); see 
supra Section III(C). 
 206.  Complaint, United States v. Boykin, No. 6:08-CV-01306 (D. Kan. Oct. 14, 2008). 
 207.  See Benderly, supra note 26; Klumpp, supra note 68 and accompanying text.  
 208.  See supra Section II(B); LMM, supra note 184. 
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ing with his or her PI to accept an NRSA fellowship. This puts post-
docs in an unfavorable position of having to choose between a last-
minute decision to go against his or her PIs wishes or to accept the 
burden of the payback provision. 
Additionally, many successful biomedical researchers did not de-
cide to pursue research careers until after earning their degrees. For 
example, a survey of 516 successful clinical researchers in internal med-
icine indicated that 34% did not choose to enter their research careers 
until they were already in their residencies or fellowship training.209 If 
those researchers had been dissuaded by a payback requirement, they 
would not have become successful researchers. Luckily, most of them 
indicated that they would not have been dissuaded by a payback re-
quirement, but 22% of those who had fulfilled military requirements 
by undergoing research training said they would not have embarked 
on their research careers if they had been subject to a payback require-
ment.210 Therefore, if the payback provision dissuades some postdocs 
from continuing in research careers, it is likely to weed out some who 
would otherwise become successful researchers. 
Third, the argument that switching careers to practice medicine 
wastes NRSA resources does not apply to postdocs who hold Ph.D.s 
and not medical degrees. Continuing the legislation’s founders’ rea-
soning, the payback requirement would be more of a hardship for peo-
ple with Ph.D.s than M.D.s because people with Ph.D.s make on av-
erage less money than those who practice medicine.211 For example, in 
a subcommittee hearing, Dr. Albert Sabin argued that “the training of 
Ph.D.’s in the preclinical sciences and basic sciences is quite a different 
operation from that involving people who have obtained their M.D. 
but want to spend their life in research,” and “they should not carry 
the ‘payback’ burden.”212 Despite these protests, the payback provision 
 
 209.  Wayne K. Davis & William N. Kelley, Factors Influencing Decisions to Enter Ca-
reers in Clinical Investigation, 57 J. MED. EDUC. 275, 277–78 (1982). 
 210.  Id. at 279.  
 211.  NRSA Fellowship Hearings, supra note 131, at 264 (letter of John T. Edsall, Profes-
sor of Biochemistry) (“People who go on into medical practice, of course, generally make much 
larger incomes than [researchers]”). 
 212.  Quality of Health Care Hearings, supra note 104, at 1271–73 (Statement of Albert 
Sabin, M.D., Fogarty International Center, National Institutes of Health); see also 119 CONG. 
REC. H17, 479 (May 31, 1973) (statement of Mr. Drinan) (“After 4 years of College and 5 years 
of graduate work, these students will normally take 2 to 3 years of postgraduate work at salaries 
in the range of 7-8,000 dollars yearly, and then they will move to academic positions where some 
may reach the upper 20,000 dollar range, but many more will remain at around 20,000 dollars. 
We are far away from the 100,000 dollar salaries [of medical practitioners]”) (quoting Prof. Rob-
ert W. Jeanloz of Harvard Medical School). 
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is applied to both M.D. postdocs and Ph.D. postdocs in the same man-
ner. 
Further, the rationale that those who do not stay in research ca-
reers will make vastly more money in other careers and can easily pay 
back their training funds does not apply to people who make less 
money in public service careers. Consider David Cheng, who taught 
in an elementary school after completing his NRSA fellowship.213 As a 
teacher, he would probably make less money than he would as, for ex-
ample, a biochemist, and possibly even less than he made as a post-
doc.214 Although teaching is something that provides a public benefit, 
he was punished for it because of Congress’s reasoning that he might 
make more money by “going out into rich practice.”215 
Congress’s tough love approach toward its trainees has a sense of 
vindictiveness to it. One person went so far as to compare it to the 
Soviet exit tax, stating, “what [was] wrong with the Soviet exit tax [was] 
the discriminatory way it [was] in practice applied.”216 In the case of 
the payback agreement, there is also potential for discriminatory ap-
plication because of the lack of any formal guarantee that the payback 
specialists will be consistent in their administration of the require-
ment.217 Unlike the Soviet exit tax, which increased revenue for the 
Soviets, administering the payback agreement likely sucks away more 
resources from the United States than it recovers. In sum, enforcing 
the payback agreement is a waste of money, the payback provision does 
little to disincentivize non-committed postdocs from accepting 
NRSAs, and the rationale of keeping NRSA-trainees from practicing 
medicine is irrelevant for Ph.D. postdocs. 
 
 213.  United States v. Cheng, 840 F. Supp. 93, 94 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 
 214.  See Biochemists and Biophysicists, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Dec 17, 2015), 
http://www.bls.gov/ooh/life-physical-and-social-science/biochemists-and-biophysicists.htm 
(stating that biochemists and biophysicists averaged $82,150 in 2015); Kindergarten and Elemen-
tary School Teachers, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Dec 17, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/educa-
tion-training-and-library/kindergarten-and-elementary-school-teachers.htm (stating that ele-
mentary school teachers averaged $54,550 in 2015); see also Elementary School Teacher: Salary, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://money.usnews.com/careers/best-jobs/elementary-
school-teacher/salary (last visited Jan. 9, 2016) (stating that in 2013, the lowest paid elementary 
school teachers were paid an annual salary of $35,760). 
 215.  NRSA Fellowship Hearings, supra note 131, at 57 (statement of Paul G. Rogers, 
Chairman). 
 216.  Id. at 100 (statement of Joshua Lederberg, Ph.D., Chairman, Department of Genet-
ics, Stanford University School of Medicine). 
 217.  See supra Section III(C). 
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C. The Harms and Benefits of Suppressing Postdocs 
This sub-section discusses additional pros and cons of having a 
payback requirement, and  incentives it creates. Although Congress 
created the NRSA program to promote productive research, decreas-
ing postdocs’ autonomy through the payback requirement likely de-
creases their creativity and motivation.218 Moreover, this suppression 
is unnecessary because there is an abundance of postdocs that perform 
research, and an overflow into other careers may benefit the economy. 
Politically, it makes sense to pass laws that promise increased scientific 
output. However, the payback provision likely results in economic 
harm, and comes with incentives for PIs to place their postdocs on 
training grants, and thus reap a benefit without bearing the payback 
cost. The payback legislation is a classic example of politicians trying 
to please the majority population through legislation that places costs 
on a minority group. 
Those contemplating the creation of the NRSA program deter-
mined that trainees could add value as researchers during their training 
in addition to their future careers in research.219 However, because the 
payback requirement reduces postdocs’ autonomy, it likely suppresses 
their creativity and motivation. For example, empirical work in psy-
chology suggests that acting in controlling ways decreases employee 
motivation.220 On the other hand, “autonomy increases intrinsic moti-
vation, which in turn enhances creative output.”221 Thus, postdocs who 
feel constrained to stay in science research after receiving NRSA are 
likely to be less productive than if they were unconstrained. 
Further, suppressing the careers of postdoctoral NRSA-trainees is 
unnecessary because there are plenty of postdocs who stay in science 
to fulfill the nation’s research needs, and an overflow into other careers 
 
 218.  See Haleh Eghrari et al., Facilitating Internalization: The Self-Determination The-
ory Perspective, 62 J. PERSONALITY 119 (1994); Marylene Gagné & Edward L. Deci, Self-De-
termination Theory and Work Motivation, 26 J. ORG. BEHAV. 331 (2005). 
 219.  Quality of Health Care Hearings, supra note 104, at 1280 (statement of Lawrence 
Beck, University of Pennsylvania Hospital) (“[T]here is a great deal of productive research that 
comes out of the 2 or 3 years in these programs.”). 
 220.  See Eghrari, supra note 218.  
 221.  Stephanie Plamondon Bair, The Psychology of Patent Protection, 48 CONN. L. REV. 
297, 345 (2015) (citing Theresa Amabile, The Social Psychology of Creativity: A Componential 
Conceptualization, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 357, 364 (1983) (finding positive ef-
fects of autonomy on motivation that are strengthened by creative tasks)), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2637505; Gagné & Deci, supra note 218 (finding that autonomy is positively related to job 
motivation and performance). 
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may benefit our economy. As discussed earlier, there is an overabun-
dance of postdocs in relation to the amount of university jobs availa-
ble.222 Postdocs should be encouraged, not discouraged, to pursue ca-
reers in fields other than research and teaching, because they can 
benefit society by bringing their scientific insight into those other 
fields.223 This has been acknowledged for predoctoral students in re-
cent years. The Council recently stated that “graduate programs must 
accommodate a greater range of anticipated careers for students,”224 
and that “[s]tudy sections reviewing graduate training programs should 
be educated to value a range of career outcomes.”225 
Say’s Law posits that supply creates its own demand.226 The pay-
back requirement is representative of the no-longer-held belief that 
only “failures” get jobs outside of academic research. Yet, the NRSA 
program continues to contribute to the increase in the scientific work-
force that does not have sufficient professorial jobs to house them all. 
If we accept the reality that not all postdocs will become professors, we 
may see that their knowledge and skills will be valued in areas outside 
academic research. When we see from this perspective, we find that 
rather than creating an “overabundance” of postdocs, we have actually 
created a wealth of scientific expertise through NRSA and other post-
doctoral training. The more we free them to find their own positions 
within the workforce, the more they will be able to create their own 
demand by using their talents in new positions. 
One group of people that benefits from the NRSA program is the 
postdocs’ PIs who are relieved from paying their postdocs’ salaries 
when their postdocs accept NRSAs. Are PIs greedy for encouraging 
their postdocs to be on NRSA training grants when doing so makes 
their postdocs take on a burden of future payback? I do not argue that 
to be the case. I point merely to the incentives that are created by the 
laws. Politicians frequently pass laws that appear beneficial but are ac-
tually harmful to society.227 For example, price limits and rent caps lead 
to supply and housing shortages because of the economic incentives 
 
 222.  See supra Section II(B); Johnson, supra note 25; Powell, supra note 24. 
 223.  Supra discussion of knowledge spillovers in Section III(A)(4); Price, supra note 160, 
at 2; see Tambe & Hitt, supra note 159. 
 224.  NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 109, at 8. 
 225.  Id. at 9. 
 226.  See THOMAS SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS: A COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO THE 
ECONOMY 346–47 (5th ed. 2015). 
 227.  Id. at 58–63. 
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they create.228 However, legislatures pass laws that limit prices despite 
the accompanying economic harm because it looks good politically to 
try to prevent the “greedy landlord” from raising rents.229 Here, Con-
gress sought to “safeguard against . . . abuses” of funding by post-
docs,230 but in reality created incentives for PIs to benefit by placing 
burdens on their postdocs. As one economist put it in a similar context 
when describing postdocs, “[w]e had the incentives all wrong.”231 
The type of lawmaking that led to the creation of the payback re-
quirement is known as entrepreneurial politics, and is characterized by 
the large majority imposing its will on a weaker minority.232 This hap-
pens when the benefits of legislation are distributed among the major-
ity, while the costs are concentrated on the weak minority.233 Typi-
cally, in these situations, politicians get to cater to the large majority 
and gain the popular opinion. They do so generally by drafting an am-
biguous bill and delegating authority to an agency to work out the de-
tails.234 Here, the payback requirement promises to benefit the masses 
by increasing biomedical research output, but the minority of postdocs 
must bear the cost. As is typical in this type of lawmaking, the statute 
is ambiguous and passes the buck by delegating its authority to an 
agency to work out the details. Specifically, the statute is ambiguous 
because it did not define “research training, research, or teaching that 
is health-related.”235 The meaning of these words is an important part 
of the statute because the words define what is necessary to fulfill the 
payback requirement.236 Congress delegated its authority to define 
those terms to “the Secretary [of Health and Human Services],”237 and 
thus the responsibility fell on the shoulders of the NIH.238 
 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Id. 
 230.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 12, at 6. 
 231.  Powell, supra note 24, at 144 (explaining the overabundance of postdocs in the job 
market, and stating, “We made postdocs so cheap that principal investigators had lots of incen-
tives to hire them.”).  
 232.  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: 
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 56–57 (4th ed. 2007). 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Id. at 59. 
 235.  42 U.S.C. § 288(c)(1) (2012). 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  § 288(c)(3). 
 238.  NIH Policy Statement, supra note 17, § 11.4.3.1.1. 
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VI.  RECOMMENDATION 
Given the policies that disfavor a payback requirement, Congress 
should consider whether it is really necessary to retain postdocs in re-
search by having this requirement, and if it is worth its accompanying 
social harms.239 Outdated notions of not having enough highly-trained 
postdocs available for biomedical research should be abandoned in fa-
vor of the contrasting reality that there is an overabundance of post-
docs and not enough jobs for all of them to become independent re-
searchers.240 If Congress wants to ensure that more medical students 
pursue careers in research, they should focus more on positive rather 
than negative incentives. For example, if the NRSA Payback Service 
Center was discontinued, its costs could be used to provide money to 
provide more funds for research and scholarships. 
In the meantime, the NIH should provide clearer definitions of 
health-related research and teaching. This would help postdocs be 
more informed, and may help avoid situations similar to United States 
v. Cheng, where a prior NRSA-trainee found out the hard way that 
elementary school teaching was sufficiently health-related.241 
Also, the Service Center should set-up a formal process for decid-
ing in advance whether certain payback activities are acceptable. The 
formal process should produce a final decision that cannot be changed 
after the postdoc embarks on the approved service. That way, postdocs 
could find out in advance whether certain activities are acceptable, and 
then move forward with confidence after completing their NRSA 
training. 
The Service Center should also contact prior trainees who fail to 
submit acceptable Annual Payback Activities Certification forms,242 to 
provide sufficient notification for postdocs to correct their mistakes 
early. This would allow a postdoc to begin engaging in acceptable ser-
vice payback before it is too late, rather than having to pay back his or 
her stipend or be sued by the United States.243 
 
 239.  As one person put it when writing about the payback requirement, “It may be legal. 
But that does not mean it’s in any way ethical.” MLC, supra note 69. 
 240.  Harris, supra 107; Johnson, supra note 25; Powell, supra note 24, at 146. 
 241.  United States v. Cheng, 840 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Cal. 1993); see supra Section III(B). 
 242.  APAC, supra note 62; see supra Section II(D) (discussing how NRSA-trainees report 
payback activities to the Payback Service Center). 
 243.  This also might have helped to avoid the case of United States v. Cheng. 840 F. Supp. 
at 94. In the court’s opinion, no mention is made of the NRSA Payback Service Center ever 
trying to contact Mr. Cheng until seven years after he ended his NRSA training. Id.; see supra 
Section II(D), III(B). 
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Additionally, courts should be lenient on postdocs who obtain po-
sitions that seem like health-related research or teaching but are on the 
fringes of the definitions. Courts should also consider the disparate 
bargaining power that postdocs have in negotiating their positions, and 
allow contract principles to guide their analyses. 
Universities should be aware of issues that arise for postdocs when 
placing postdocs on training grants. For example, they should inform 
postdocs early on that they are subject to the payback requirement if 
they accept NRSAs. Prior to placing postdocs on training grants, train-
ing program directors should sit down with postdocs and their PIs to 
ensure that the PIs are not putting pressure244 on their postdocs to ac-
cept NRSAs, and to ensure that the postdocs are aware of the payback 
requirement. 
Finally, people should stay in science out of an intrinsic desire, not 
because they are required to. We should let scientists exercise their 
own creativity, and not yoke them down with “a counterproductive 
measure to avoid the misuse of funds.”245 If “[s]cientists and engineers 
ought to stand side by side with athletes and entertainers as role mod-
els,” as President Obama directed,246 we should give them our confi-
dence in choosing how to pursue their careers. This will allow them to 
provide an unlimited contribution to the public good. For years, sci-
entists have brought us inventions that were never even dreamed of. If 
we restrain them, we may be doing ourselves a disservice by preventing 
their creativity from taking hold in unforeseen ways.247 





 244.  LMM, supra note 184. 
 245.  Quality of Health Care Hearings, supra note 104, at 1272 (statement of Albert Sabin, 
M.D., Fogarty International Center, National Institutes of Health).  
 246.  President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the “Education to Innovate” 
Campaign, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 23, 2009, 11:46 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-education-innovate-campaign. 
 247.  See Quality of Health Care Hearings, supra note 104, at 1272–73 (statement of Albert 
Sabin, M.D., Fogarty International Center, National Institutes of Health) (“To force depart-
ments to retain such persons to carry out services prescribed in the act, would only be a disservice 
to research, rather than a service.”). 
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